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"THIS COURT TOOK
A WRONG TURN WITH BATES:"
WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVISIT
LAWYER ADVERTISING
RALPH H. BROCK*
"Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions."**
ABSTRACT:
With the ever-increasing use of advertisements on electronic
broadcast media, the necessity to regulate legal advertising
simultaneously develops. The U.S. Supreme Court has not heard a case
concerning legal advertising in over twenty years and has never
addressed the issue in the context of electronic media. This Article will
highlight the established limitations placed on lawyer advertising; these
restrictions on First Amendment rights are accepted by members of the
legal profession. The piece then follows the Supreme Court's evolving
jurisprudence in the realm of legal advertising, and takes issue with the
Federal Trade Commission 's asserted, but misplaced, jurisdiction over
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lawyer advertisements. In the midst of differing signals and caselaw,
lower courts have struggled to analyze permissible or impeding
regulations at the state level in the context of electronic ads, and two
case studies are explored extensively. Finally, this Article asserts the
need for state bar regulation of quality of legal services claims,
particularly in the burgeoning field of electronic and broadcast media
advertisements.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine, if you will, a television advertisement patterned after
the opening scene from The Black Widow, the September 27, 2005
episode of the Boston Legal television series.1 The ad opens with a shot
of the city's central downtown legal district. The camera finds the
lawyer who, like the arrogant and ethically-challenged lead characters of
Boston Legal, Denny Crane and Alan Shore, strides purposefully,
resolutely into the scene.2 The accompanying music is Henry Mancini's
pounding jazz theme from the Peter Gunn television detective series.3
Implicit in this lawyer's message is that she looks great-she does not
have to ask4 -and like the lawyers in the fictional firm of Crane, Poole &
Schmidt, she is invincible. Her name and contact information are
superimposed on the unfolding scene. No words are spoken; none are
needed.
1. Summary of Boston Legal: The Black Widow (ABC television broadcast
Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.boston-legal.org/l-blackwidow/ep1-blackwidow.shtml
(last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
2. The author has seen yellow page ads for various law firms, many in the same
telephone directory, featuring identical pictures of William Shatner, the Canadian-
born actor who portrays Denny Crane, that suggest he is a member of the firm.
Since Shatner is not a lawyer, such ads are inherently deceptive and misleading. He
also does television ads for law firms. See, e.g., http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
xe6t9UQvto0 (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
3. Although the Peter Gunn series is fifty years old, running from 1958-61, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PeterGunn (last visited Apr. 7, 2009). The theme, as
the Boston Legal episode suggests, is still quite recognizable. See Boston Legal: The
Black Widow, supra note 1.
4. In the Boston Legal episode, the Peter Gunn theme stops briefly as Alan
Shore asks, in reference to an earlier episode, "Denny, we look good, right?" Denny
Crane replies, "We look great." The Peter Gunn theme resumes. See Boston Legal:
The Black Widow, supra note 1.
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Today the fictitious Boston Legal-inspired ad would hardly raise
an eyebrow. Yet it would convey a highly subjective and unverifiable
message about the quality of the lawyer's services, and it would do so
without the use of any verbal expression. Such an advertisement would
not work in anything but the electronic media. This Article starts with
the premise that any quality-of-legal-services advertising is subjective
and unverifiable, is inherently misleading, especially in the electronic
and broadcast media, and is inconsistent with the privilege of
membership in a learned profession "burdened with conditions.', 5 The
issue addressed here is whether and how such advertisements may be
regulated (or even prohibited) by the Rules of Professional Conduct
without violating First Amendment-protected commercial speech rights.
This Article will start by putting into perspective the generally
accepted burdens on lawyers' First Amendment rights. Then it will lay
the foundation for further discussion by surveying the Supreme Court
cases involving lawyer advertising. Next, it will address how the Federal
Trade Commission has interfered in state rule-making decisions (despite
its lack of jurisdiction) by arguing that any professional advertising that
is not demonstrably false, fraudulent, or misleading is in the public
interest and should be allowed. After that, the Article will consider the
lower court cases that have been trying to apply the Supreme Court
decisions on printed advertising to various forms of electronic
advertising, focusing on two cases in particular. Finally, the Article will
suggest how state bars can constitutionally regulate quality-of-legal-
services advertisements, especially television advertisements that utilize
unverifiable slogans, self-laudation, puffery, hyperbole, and the like.
I. SOME CONDITIONS THAT BURDEN THE PRIVILEGE OF
MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR
A. Universally Accepted Burdens on a Lawyer's First Amendment
Rights
No one can dispute that the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech is not absolute. As Justice Holmes famously put it, "The most
5. In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917).
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stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."6 The modem counterpart
is joking about bombs or security in an airport check-in line.7 In the
context of legal ethics, the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility contain many limitations, apart from the Information
about Legal Services (advertising) rules, that generally place restrictions
on a lawyer's right to say certain things that could benefit the lawyer, a
client, or both. For example, a lawyer is generally prohibited from:
• revealing confidential information;
" revealing information relating to the representation of a former
client;
• revealing information learned in a consultation with a
prospective client, even if no client-lawyer relationship ensues;
• communicating ex parte with a judge, juror, prospective juror,
or other official;
* communicating with a discharged juror or prospective juror in
certain circumstances;
* making an extrajudicial statement that will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding;
• communicating without consent about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented
by another lawyer;
• stating or implying to an unrepresented person that the lawyer
is disinterested;
- giving legal advice to an unrepresented person whose interests
are in conflict with a client's;
* making a statement that the lawyer knows to be false
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge; or
• stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a
6. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). By 1941 the theater had
become a "crowded" one. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 296 (1941)
("One cannot yell 'Fire' in a crowded theater.").
7. See, e.g., Transportation Security Administration information,
http://tristatehomepage.com/content/fulltext/?cid=35701 ("Talk to your children
before you come to the airport and let them know that it's against the law to make
threats such as, 'I have a bomb in my bag.' Threats made jokingly (even by a child)
can delay the entire family and could result in fines.") (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
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government agency or official.8
Lawyers accept these normative limitations on substantive free
speech rights-these conditions that burden the privilege of practicing
law-because they are essential for maintaining client confidences and
preserving the integrity of the profession. As Justice Stewart wrote:
A lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited
standards of propriety and honor, which experience
has shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the
accomplishment of justice. He who would follow
that calling must conform to those standards.
Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention
from what in other circumstances might be
constitutionally protected speech.9
But as we shall see, when the issue is First Amendment rights to
commercial speech versus decorum and dignity consistent with the
standards of a learned profession, it is the obedience to ethical precepts
that has had to yield.
B. Traditional Limits on Lawyer Advertising
Until the mid-1970s, ethical rules prohibited most, if not all,
forms of lawyer advertising.' 0 Generally, the Supreme Court adhered to
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a); 1.9(c)(2); 1.18(b); 3.5(b);
3.5(c); 3.6(a); 4.2; 4.3; 8.2(a); 8.4(e) (2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/ (follow the "Table of Contents" hyperlink, then
follow the hyperlink for a specific rule).
9. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring). See
also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (opinion of Rehnquist,
C.J.) ("It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding,
whatever right to 'free speech' an attorney has is extremely circumscribed ....
Even outside the courtroom .. . lawyers in pending cases were subject to ethical
restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be.").
10. See, e.g., CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 27 (1963), available at
https://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/Canons_- Ethics.pdf; MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-9, DR 2-102 (1980), available at https://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mrpc/mcpr.pdf; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 and 7.2 (2007), available
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/ (follow the "Table of Contents" hyperlink, then
follow the hyperlink for Rule 7.1 or Rule 7.2).
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the broad rule articulated in Valentine v. Chrestensen,11 a handbill
distribution case, that while the First Amendment guards against
government restriction of speech in most contexts, "the Constitution
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising." The commercial advertising rule was so well-settled that
challenges to restrictions on professional advertising were brought, not
on First Amendment grounds, but on due process, equal protection, or
interstate commerce interference grounds. 12 The first crack in the faqade
appeared in 1975, in Bigelow v. Virginia,13 when the Court struck down
Virginia's attempt to prohibit a newspaper advertisement that announced
the availability of legal abortions and provided contact information for
obtaining such services because the advertisement conveyed information
of potential interest and value that "coincided with the constitutional
interests of the general public."' 4 After following Valentine consistently
11. 316U.S. 52 (1942).
12. See, e.g., Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963)
(New Mexico statute prohibiting a newspaper and a radio station from publishing
ads for a Texas optometrist did not impose a constitutionally prohibited burden upon
interstate commerce); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (state
statute that (1) prohibited an optician from fitting or duplicating lenses without a
prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist; (2) prohibited the
advertisement of spectacles, eyeglasses, lenses or prisms, eyeglass frames,
mountings, or other optical appliances; and (3) barred operators of retail stores from
furnishing space therein to any person purporting to do eye examination or visual
care did not violate due process); Semler v. Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935)
(state statute that regulated advertising of dental services did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause or impair the obligation of contracts). "Although the First
Amendment issue was raised in Head, the Court refused to consider it because the
issue had been neither presented to the state courts nor reserved in the notice of
appeal." Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 357 n.8 (1977).
Even when advertising restrictions were challenged on First Amendment
grounds, the Court afforded only limited protection. "When dealing with restrictions
on commercial speech we frame our decisions narrowly, 'allowing modes of
regulation [of commercial speech] that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression."' Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (citing
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)) (holding that a state
could prohibit the use of trade names by optometrists, particularly in view of the
considerable history of deception and abuse worked upon the consuming public
through the use of trade names).
13. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
14. Id. at 822.
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for more than thirty years, the Court in Bigelow reversed course and
dismissed it as a limited decision relating only to reasonable restrictions
on the manner of advertising, which did "not support any sweeping
proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.",
5
The next year, the Court held in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,16 a case
involving a state prohibition on advertising prescription drug prices, that
the advertisement of prescription drug prices was protected under the
First Amendment notwithstanding its commercial speech character, but it
was subject to some permissible regulation." At the same time, the
Court noted "special problems of the electronic broadcast media" and
reserved the question whether advertising for legal and medical services
''may require consideration of quite different factors" due to the
"enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to
undertake certain kinds of advertising."' 8
II. A QUICK SURVEY OF LAWYER ADVERTISING CASES
IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. From Bates to Went For It.
A year after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court took
up the issue of lawyer advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.
19
Bates involved disciplinary proceedings against two lawyers for running
a newspaper advertisement that listed certain legal services the lawyers
15. Id. at 820.
16. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
17. Id. at 770.
18. Id. at 773 & n.25. More recently, the Court has been very liberal in finding
statutory restrictions on commercial advertising to be unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (the statutory ban on
advertising compounded drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 353(a), violated pharmacies'
commercial free speech rights); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States,
527 U.S. 173 (1999) (18 U.S.C. § 1304 and the FCC's regulation restricting
advertisements related to gambling violated the broadcasters' commercial free
speech rights); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (the statutory
prohibition on disclosure of the alcohol content of beer on labels or in advertising,
27 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., violated brewer's commercial free speech rights).
19. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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offered and the fees charged for those services. Noting that the Arizona
Bar sponsored a Legal Services Program with standard rates for routine
services, the Court observed that the only services that lent themselves to
advertising are the routine ones.20 The narrow holding in Bates was that
the State Bar may not "prevent the publication in a newspaper of [an
attorney's] truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms
of routine legal services. ' 21 What is more interesting, and perhaps more
important, are the limitations on advertising that the Court said might be
permitted:
* Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading can be
22prohibited.
- Advertising claims as to the quality of legal services, which are
not susceptible of measurement or verification, may be so likely
23to be misleading as to permit restriction.
* Similarly, in-person solicitation might be restricted.24
" "And the special problems of advertising on the electronic
broadcast media will warrant special consideration.
25
1. Ohralik In-Person Lawyer Solicitation Can Be Proscribed
in the Name of Professionalism
The next year, in the case of an ACLU cooperating attorney who
was disciplined for advising a victim of sterilization that the organization
would provide free legal assistance, the Court held that such discipline
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments because the lawyer
20. Id. at 372-73.
21. Id. at 384. The Supreme Court of California anticipated Bates in Jacoby v.
State Bar of California, 562 P.2d 1326 (Cal. 1977), which held that the use of the
term "legal clinic" rather than "law office" did not violate a California rule of
professional conduct that "specified that the only permissible 'sign' for a lawyer to
use was one 'disclosing his name or the name of his law firm, and the word attorney,
attorney at law, counselor at law, lawyer, or law office,"' in order to prevent
deception, "and the State Bar has not shown that the term 'legal clinic' is in any
sense deceiving." Id. at 1331 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
23. Id. at 383-84.
24. Id. at 384.
25. Id.
solicited the litigation, not for pecuniary gain, but as a vehicle for
effective political expression and association, as well as a means of
communicating useful information to the public.2 6  The same day,
though, in a case involving a disciplinary proceeding for direct, in-person
solicitation of prospective clients, the Court seemed to limit permissible
commercial speech by lawyers to the narrow facts in Bates. In Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n,27 the Court distinguished the "restrained"
advertising sanctioned in Bates from in-person solicitation for pecuniary
gain, which "has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession's
ideal of the attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant
potential for harm to the prospective client.' 28 The Court went on to
explain that the state interests implicated in a case of remunerative
employment by in-person solicitation "are particularly strong:"
In addition to its general interest in protecting
consumers and regulating commercial transactions,
the State bears a special responsibility for
maintaining standards among members of the
licensed professions. "The interest of the States in
regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers
are essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice, and have historically been
'officers of the courts."' Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). While lawyers act in
part as "self-employed businessmen," they also act
"as trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to
the court in search of a just solution to disputes."
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961). 29
"While the Court in Bates determined that truthful, restrained
advertising of the prices of 'routine' legal services would not have an
adverse effect on the professionalism of lawyers," the Ohralik Court said
that "this was only because it found 'the postulated connection between
advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely
26. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,431 (1978).
27. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
28. Id. at 454.
29. Id. at 460 (internal citation omitted).
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strained. ',,30 "The Bates Court did not question a State's interest in
maintaining high standards among licensed professionals. Indeed, to the
extent that the ethical standards of lawyers are linked to the service and
protection of clients, they do further the goals of 'true
professionalism."'
31
2. Central Hudson: Now the First Amendment
Protects Commercial Speech
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York 32 is not a lawyer advertising case, but it must
be included in this discussion because it and its progeny turned
commercial speech regulation (especially the state's interest in
maintaining high standards among licensed professionals) on its head.
Central Hudson involved a First and Fourteenth Amendment challenge
to a state prohibition on all advertising by a public utility promoting the
30. Id. at 460-61 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 368) (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 461 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 368). But see Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 774 (1993) (stating that "Ohralik does not stand for the proposition that
blanket bans on personal solicitation by all types of professionals are constitutional
in all circumstances," and holding that a ban on in-person solicitation by certified
public accountants, which was not "'inherently conducive to overreaching and other
forms of misconduct"' was unconstitutional. (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464)).
Two years after Bates, the Court held that the prohibition on the practice of
optometry under a trade name is a constitutionally permissible state regulation in
furtherance of protecting the public from demonstrated deceptive and misleading use
of optometrical trade names.
Here, we are concerned with a form of commercial speech
that has no intrinsic meaning. A trade name conveys no
information about the price and nature of the services offered
by an optometrist until it acquires meaning over a period of
time by associations formed in the minds of the public
between the name and some standard of price or quality.
Because these ill-defined associations of trade names with
price and quality information can be manipulated by the
users of trade names, there is a significant possibility that
trade names will be used to mislead the public.
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979)
32. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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use of electricity. Relying on Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the
Court said that
[c]ommercial expression not only serves the
economic interest of the speaker, but also assists
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the
fullest possible dissemination of information. In
applying the First Amendment to this area, we have
rejected the "highly paternalistic" view that
government has complete power to suppress or
regulate commercial speech. "[P]eople will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and ... the best means to that end is to
open the channels of communication, rather than to
close them ....
The Court then articulated a three-part analysis for determining
whether lawful and non-misleading commercial expression is protected
by the First Amendment: (1) is the asserted governmental interest
substantial? (2) does the regulation directly advance the governmental
interest asserted? and (3) is it more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest?
34
The Court has said "the application of the Central Hudson test
was 'substantially similar' to the application of the test for validity of
time, place, and manner restrictions upon protected speech-which [it]
specifically has held does not require least restrictive means., 35 Since
33. Id. at 561-62 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)) (alteration in original).
34. Id. at 566.
35. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)
(emphasis in original); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987). See also Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985).
We reject appellant's contention that we should subject
disclosure requirements to a strict 'least restrictive means'
analysis under which they must be struck down if there are
other means by which the State's purposes may be served.
Although we have subjected outright prohibitions on speech
to such analysis, all our discussions of restraints on
commercial speech have recommended disclosure
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"'commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values,' and is subject to 'modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression,' the Court
said, quoting Ohralik, "[tlhe ample scope of regulatory authority
suggested by such statements would be illusory if it were subject to a
least-restrictive-means requirement, which imposes a heavy burden on
the State. 36 Nevertheless, the Court has described the Central Hudson
test as an intermediate scrutiny standard of review.37
In a lawyer advertising case, the first prong of the Central
Hudson test is easily met. If the ad is not misleading, "'[t]he interest of
the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are
essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice,
and have historically been officers of the courts. '38 The second prong
concerns the relationship between the harm that
underlies the State's interest and the means
identified by the State to advance that interest. It
requires that "the speech restriction directly and
materially advance the asserted governmental
interest. 'This burden is not satisfied by mere
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental
body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are
real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree."'
39
requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive
alternatives to actual suppression of speech.
Id.
36. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. at 477 (quoting Ohralik,
436 U.S. at 456) (alteration in original).
37. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Fla.
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) ("[W]e engage in 'intermediate'
scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech, analyzing them under the framework
set forth in Central Hudson .... ).
38. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460 (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
792 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)).
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This second prong, the Court has said, does not require that
"'empirical data come . . . accompanied by a surfeit of background
information . . . . [W]e have permitted litigants to justify speech
restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different
locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify
restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and simple common
sense. ''4° But as we shall see, without some evidence to support the
second prong, the regulation will fail.
The last prong of the Central Hudson test is "'whether the
speech restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve the
interests that support it."' 41 Although it is difficult to distinguish the "not
more extensive than necessary" standard from the "least restrictive
means" standard, the Court insists that the two are not the same.
"[I]nstead, the case law requires a reasonable 'fit between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, . . . a
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective."'
42
3. R.MJ.: Truthful, Non-misleading Listing of Practice Areas
Cannot Be Prohibited
The first lawyer advertising case decided by the Court after
Central Hudson was In re R.MJ.43 In that case, a lawyer was disciplined
for violating a rule written to comply with Bates. The rule allowed a
lawyer to
"publish . . . in newspapers, periodicals and the
yellow pages of telephone directories" [ten]
categories of information: name, address[,] and
telephone number; areas of practice; date and place
of birth; schools attended; foreign language ability;
office hours; fee for an initial consultation;
availability of a schedule of fees; credit
40. Id. (quoting Went For It, 515 U.S. at 628) (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 566 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527
U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
42. Id. at 556 (quoting Went For It, 515 U.S. at 632) (alteration in original).
43. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
20091
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arrangements; [to state] the fixed fee to be charged
for certain specified "routine" legal services
and list a general practice in one of three ways, or list one or more of
• 44
twenty-three areas of specific practice. The lawyer was disciplined for
using alternative terms for practice areas ("real estate" for "property
law," for example), listing areas of practice not listed in the rule, and
listing the jurisdictions of licensure.45
The Court summarized the commercial speech doctrine, in the
context of advertising for professional services, as follows:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.
But when the particular content or method of the
advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading
or when experience has proved that in fact such
advertising is subject to abuse, the States may
impose appropriate restrictions, and misleading
advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the
States may not place an absolute prohibition on
certain types of potentially misleading information,
e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information
also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.
. . . Although the potential for deception and
confusion is particularly strong in the context of
advertising professional services, restrictions upon
such advertising may be no broader than reasonably
46
necessary to prevent the deception.
If the communication is not misleading, the state must assert a
substantial interest before it can regulate the advertisement, and "the
interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served.
47
The Court concluded that because the ad describing a "real estate"
practice, rather than "property," and the listing of areas not on the list of
practice areas provided by the bar, were not inaccurate or misleading,
44. Id. at 194-95 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR 2-101 (B)
(1978) (Index Vol.)).
45. Id. at 197.
46. Id. at 203.
47. Id.
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and since the bar showed no substantial interest promoted by the
restriction, the ad could not be prohibited."
4. Zauderer: Use of Accurate Illustration of Dalkon Shield
Cannot Be Proscribed in the Name of Professionalism
Three years later, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of the Supreme Court of Ohio,49 the Court expanded the scope of
permissible practice-area advertising to illustrations. The lawyer ran a
newspaper advertisement publicizing his willingness to represent women
who had suffered injuries resulting from their use of a contraceptive
known as the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.50 The advertisement
featured a line drawing of the device in violation of a rule imposing a
blanket prohibition on the use of illustrations in lawyer advertising.51 The
advertisement stated that the Dalkon Shield had caused infections and
unplanned pregnancies; that the attorney was currently handling lawsuits
in such cases and was willing to represent other women asserting similar
claims; that readers should not assume that their claims were
time-barred; that cases were handled on a contingent-fee basis; and that
"[i]f there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients." 52 The
Office of Disciplinary Counsel charged the lawyer, inter alia, with
violating the disciplinary rule that prohibited the use of illustrations and a
rule requiring attorney ads to be "dignified.,
53
Noting that because the illustration of the Dalkon Shield was
accurate and not misleading, the Court placed the burden on the state to
show a substantial governmental interest justifying the restriction, and
that the restriction is the least restrictive available.54 The Court expressed
doubt that the state had a substantial interest in requiring that advertising
be presented "iii - ';gnified manner," as required by the disciplinary rule
48. Id. at 205.
49. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
50. Id. at 630.
51. Id. at 630-32.
52. Id. at 631.
53. Id. at 632.
54. Id. at 647.
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in question. That some members of the bar might find the advertisement
beneath their dignity did not justify suppressing it.55
Insofar as the reprimand was based on the lawyer's use of an
accurate illustration of the Dalkon Shield in his advertisement and his
offer of legal advice, the Court said, the reprimand violated his First
56Amendment commercial speech rights. The Court emphasized that
"because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an
advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, 'warning[s] or
disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ... in order to dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception."' 57
5. Shapero: Ban That Targeted Truthful and Nondeceptive Direct-mail
Solicitation Violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments
Another three years transpired before the Court, in Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n,58 broadened the scope of permissible lawyer
advertising even more, drawing a distinction between direct, in-person
solicitation of prospective clients that the (pre-Central Hudson) Court
had condemned in Ohralik, and the permissible solicitation of legal
business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful, nondeceptive letters to
potential clients known to face particular legal problems. Such
advertising was constitutionally protected commercial speech, the Court
said, and even though it might present lawyers with opportunities for
isolated abuses or mistakes, the Bar could regulate them through less
restrictive and more precise means than a categorical ban, such as
requiring lawyers to file any solicitation letter with the Bar.59
The letter in Shapero contained multiple underscored, uppercase
letters that "fairly shouts at the recipient" to employ the lawyer. It
55. Id. at 647-48.
56. Id. at 655-56. The Court sustained Zauderer's reprimand for offering to
represent drunken driving cases on a contingent-fee basis, and for omitting
information regarding the client's obligation to pay costs in his contingent-fee
arrangements in his Dalkon Shield advertisement. Id.
57. Id. at 651 (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982) (alteration in
orginal)).
58. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
59. Id. at 476.
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stopped short of promising results, but barely.60 Nevertheless, in what
must be one of the lowest moments in lawyer advertising litigation, the
Court said that "a truthful and non-deceptive letter, no matter how big its
type and how much it speculates can never 'shou[t] at the recipient' or
'gras[p] him by the lapels' as can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face
solicitation."6 1 The Court did concede that a letter may be misleading if
it unduly emphasizes trivial or relative uninformative facts, such as
membership in the bar of the U.S. Supreme Court, or "offers overblown
assurances of client satisfaction," reiterating the possibility mentioned in
Bates that claims as to the quality of legal services may be so misleading
as to warrant restriction, but those claims were not asserted in Shapero.
62
Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that "[t]he roots of the error
in our attorney advertising cases are a defective analogy between
professional services and standardized consumer products and a
correspondingly inappropriate skepticism about the States' justifications
. . ,,63
for their regulations. She continued:
One distinguishing feature of any profession, unlike
other occupations that may be equally respectable, is
that membership entails an ethical obligation to
temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by
adhering to standards of conduct . . . . Both the
special privileges incident to membership in the
profession and the advantages those privileges give
in the necessary task of earning a living are means to
a goal that transcends the accumulation of wealth.
64That goal is public service ....
60. Id. at 478.
61. Id. at 479.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 487 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 488-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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6. Peel: Listing True and Verifiable Specialization
Certification Could Not Be Prohibited
Next, in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission of Illinois,65 a plurality reemphasized the Court's policy of
favoring regulation, rather than an outright ban, of commercial speech in
a case in which the disciplined lawyer's letterhead stated that he had
been certified as a trial specialist by the National Board of Trial
66Advocacy (NBTA). The Illinois disciplinary commission charged that
this was a potentially misleading representation because the NBTA was
not an Illinois certification authority. The plurality, consistent with prior
opinions, said that a state may not completely ban statements that are not
actually or inherently misleading. 67  The statement, which was
susceptible of measurement or verification, could be regulated by
screening such certifying organizations, or by requiring a disclaimer
about certifying organizations or standards of specialty. 68 Even if the
lawyer's letterhead might be potentially misleading, the plurality
explained, "that potential does not satisfy the State's heavy burden of
justifying a categorical prohibition against the dissemination of accurate
factual information to the public. 69  The plurality did note that the
Commission had no empirical evidence to support its claim of
deception. 70 "The Commission's concern about the possibility of
65. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
66. Id. at 107. Accord Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'I Regulation, 512
U.S. 136 (1994) (holding that the Board of Accountancy could not discipline a
lawyer / CPA who was also a Certified Financial Planner (CFP) for using the
designations "CPA" and "CFP" in her advertising and other communication to the
public in relation to her law practice). But see In re Advisory Comm. on Prof 1
Ethics Opinion No. 447, 432 A.2d 59, 62 (N.J. 1981) (the practice of including
extra-legal qualifications on a law firm letterhead, i.e., a CPA designation, "creates a
possibility of confusion that is sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of
restrictions on the place and manner of the communication.").
67. Peel, 496 U.S. at 110. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384
(1977); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
68. Peel, 496 U.S. at 110.
69. Id. at 109.
70. Id. at 108.
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deception in hypothetical cases is not sufficient to rebut the constitutional
• ,,,71
presumption favoring disclosure over concealment.
7. Went For It: Thirty-day Prohibition on Targeted, Direct-mail
Solicitations of Accident Victims Upheld; Bar Has Substantial Interest in
Protecting Injured Citizens from Invasive Conduct
and Erosion of Confidence in the Profession
The Court's most recent pronouncement on lawyer commercial
speech came in 1995 in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.72 Went For It is
significant because it demonstrates how the Bar can defend a rule
restricting lawyer advertising by mustering evidence under the second
prong of Central Hudson to show that it has a substantial interest inS73
protecting against erosion of confidence in the profession.
The rule at issue in Went For It prohibited lawyers from sending
targeted, direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for thirty
days following an accident or disaster, or accepting referrals obtained in
violation of that prohibition. The state bar asserted that its interest in
protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their
loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers was
substantial, as was its interest "in preventing the erosion of confidence in
the profession that such repeated invasions have engendered."" In
support, it proffered a 106 page summary of a two-year study of lawyer
advertising and solicitation that showed that "the ... public views direct-
mail solicitations in the immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on
privacy that reflects poorly on the profession.
7 1
71. Id. at 111.
72. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). Went For It, Inc. was a lawyer-owned referral service
that sought to contact accident victims or their survivors within thirty days of
accidents and refer potential clients to participating Florida lawyers. Id. at 621.
73. Id. at 627-28 (describing the record made by the Bar citing various surveys
and editorials criticizing the use of targeted direct mail to accident victims).
74. Id. at 635.
75. Id. at 626. "The Bar's proffered study... provides evidence indicating that
the harms it targets are far from illusory. The palliative devised by the Bar to
address these harms is narrow both in scope and in duration. The Constitution, in
our view, requires nothing more." Id. at 635.
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The Florida rule, however, was not an outright prohibition
against direct-mail solicitation, but only a thirty-day restriction on such
activity, which is consistent with the Court's policy of regulation rather
than banning commercial speech. The Court was satisfied that the rule
"targets a concrete, non-speculative harm. 76
B. The Supreme Court's Review of Lawyer Advertising Has Been
Limited to Print and Direct Mail Advertisements
Two things are worthy of note at this juncture. Beginning with
Bates and continuing even after Central Hudson, the Court has
considered lawyer advertising cases involving only written
77
advertisements and in-person solicitations. The Court has never
addressed "the special problems of advertising on the electronic media
[that] will warrant special consideration," which it reserved in Bates.78
Neither has the Court considered the other question reserved in Bates,
whether advertising claims as to the quality of legal services, which are
not susceptible of measurement or verification, may be so misleading as
to warrant restriction.79
The second noteworthy point is that the Court has consistently
favored lawyer commercial speech that is "susceptible of measurement
or verification." It could be said that the susceptible-of-measurement-or-
verification standard, in the context of lawyer advertising cases, is
another way of articulating the first prong of the Central Hudson test,
that to be protected, the commercial speech must not be misleading.
While the Court has never written on the merits of any form of
lawyer advertising in the broadcast or electronic media, or on any cases
involving subjective quality of services claims, it has left one tantalizing
morsel on the table. In Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v.
Humphrey (Humphrey 1), the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that under
Bates, television ads that did not aid the public in making an informed
76. Id. at 629.
77. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 473 (1988) ("Our lawyer
advertising cases have never distinguished among various modes of written
advertising to the general public.") (emphasis added).
78. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
79. Id. at 383-84.
[Vol. 7
decision about hiring a lawyer could be prohibited.80 The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded Humphrey I in light of Zauderer.
81
The advertising rules at issue in Humphrey I listed nineteen
"items thought to be useful to the public (names, fields of practice, office
and telephone answering service hours, hourly fee rate, fixed fees, range
of fees for specific legal services, date and place of bar admissions,
various licenses and memberships, etc.).",82 The rules further provided
that:
The same information, in words and numbers only,
articulated by a single non-dramatic voice, not that
of the lawyer, and with no other background sound,
may be communicated on television. In the case of
television, no visual display shall be allowed except
that allowed in print as articulated by the announcer.
All such communications on radio and television, to
the extent possible, shall be made only in the
geographical area in which the lawyer maintains
offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's
clientele resides. Any such information shall be
83presented in a dignified manner.
The television ads in question involved actors in fictitious
settings talking about how persons injured by the conduct of others
"should be talking to a lawyer," emphasizing the importance of which
84lawyer to choose. Graphics of the firm's name, address and phone
number appeared on the screen and a voice-over said that "If you're
injured through the negligence of others, call the law firm of Humphrey,
Haas & Gritzner. Cases involving auto accidents, work comp [sic],
serious personal injury and wrongful death handled on a percentage
80. 355 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Iowa 1984), vacated and remanded, 472 U.S. 1004
(1985). Accord Bishop v. Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1229 (S.D.
Iowa 1981).
81. Humphrey v. Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar
Ass'n, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
82. Humphrey I, 355 N.W.2d at 568.
83. Id. at 568-69.
84. Id. at 566.
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basis. No charge for initial consultation. Call now at 288-0102."8 The
telephone number was repeated twice. The Iowa court concluded that
when the "efforts [of the advertising industry and the electronic media]
are combined on behalf of a lawyer, a line can and should be drawn
between what informs the public and what promotes the lawyer.,
86
On remand, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected any claim that
Zauderer required a different result. "We took [the Bates exclusion of
"special problems" inherent in electronic broadcasts] seriously and at
face value" and "[t]he majority opinion in Zauderer strictly adheres to
the exclusion of electronic advertising by carefully omitting it from its
sweep"-actually, it excluded electronic advertising by repeatedly
• • • 87
emphasizing written advertising.
Humphrey II is significant from a procedural standpoint because
the lawyers' second appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed for want
88
of a substantial federal question. A dismissal for want of a substantial
federal question, although not necessarily entitled to full precedential
weight,89 constitutes a decision on the merits. 9° Thus we finally have a
Supreme Court decision on the merits regarding a lawyer's
advertisement, regardless of whatever precedential weight the Court may
decide to give it in the future, that draws a clear distinction between
objective and verifiable written advertising and self-laudatory advertising
on television.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 571.
87. See Comm. on Prof I Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey (Humphrey I1), 377
N.W.2d 643, 645-46 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal
question, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986). See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
384 (1977) ("The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State may
prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellant's truthful advertisement
concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services.").
88. Humphrey v. Comm. on Prof I Ethics & Conduct, 475 U.S. 1114 at 1114
(1986).
89. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974).
90. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 849 (1997). See also Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
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C. Justice O'Connor's Plea for Professionalism
The Supreme Court has recognized, even after Central Hudson,
that some restrictions on lawyer advertising are a legitimate burden on
lawyers' First Amendment rights.91 At the same time, the Court began to
denigrate the concept of professionalism in the name of lawyers' First
Amendment commercial speech rights.92  In that context, Justice
91. Comments regarding the state's interest in regulating the legal profession
include:
- "In addition to its general interest in protecting consumers and regulating
commercial transactions, the State bears a special responsibility for maintaining
standards among members of the licensed professions." Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978).
- "While lawyers act in part as 'self-employed businessmen,' they also act 'as
trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just
solution to disputes."' Id. (quoting Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124
(1961)).
- "The Bates Court did not question a State's interest in maintaining high
standards among licensed professionals. Indeed, to the extent that the ethical
standards of lawyers are linked to the service and protection of clients, they do
further the goals of 'true professionalism."' Id. at 461 (footnote omitted).
- "[T]he special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media will
warrant special consideration." Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. In support of this
observation the Court cited Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.D.C. 1971), summarily ajf'd sub nom. Capital Broad. Co. v. Acting Attorney
General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), which upheld the constitutionality of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1335, a statute making it "unlawful to advertise cigarettes on any medium of
electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission." Id. at 584.
- "The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since
lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering
justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts."' Goldfarb v. Va.
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (internal citation omitted).
92. See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460:
[I]t appears that the ban on solicitation by lawyers originated
as a rule of professional etiquette rather than as a strictly
ethical rule. '[The] rules are based in part on deeply
ingrained feelings of tradition, honor and service. Lawyers
have for centuries emphasized that the promotion of justice,
rather than the earning of fees, is the goal of the profession.'
(internal citation omitted); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-04 (1981) (citing Bates,
433 U.S., at 368-72, 375-77) ("[T]he potentially adverse effect of advertising on
2009]
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O'Connor's plea for professionalism in her dissent in Edenfield v. Fane
is worth considering:
93
I continue to believe that this Court took a wrong
turn with Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977), and
that it has compounded this error by finding
increasingly unprofessional forms of attorney
advertising to be protected speech. See Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 85 L. Ed. 2d
652 (1985); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486
U.S. 466, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 100 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1988);
Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Comm'n ofIll., 496 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 2281, 110 L.
Ed. 2d 83 (1990) (plurality opinion). These cases
consistently focus on whether the challenged
advertisement directly harms the listener: whether it
is false or misleading, or amounts to "overreaching,
invasion of privacy, [or] the exercise of undue
influence," Shapero, supra, 486 U.S. at 475, 108 S.
Ct., at 1922, This focus is too narrow. In my view,
the States have the broader authority to prohibit
professionalism and the quality of legal services was not sufficiently related to a
substantial state interest to justify so great an interference with speech."); Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647-
48 (1985)
More fundamentally, although the State undoubtedly has a
substantial interest in ensuring that its attorneys behave with
dignity and decorum in the courtroom, we are unsure that the
State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their
communications with the public is an interest substantial
enough to justify the abridgment of their First Amendment
rights.
93. In Edenfield, the Court struck down a ban on direct, in-person solicitation
of potential clients by certified public accountants. See case cited supra note 31. As
Justice O'Connor's citations to her dissenting opinions demonstrate, she, the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia eventually comprised a block that
consistently objected to the expansion of lawyer advertising in the name of
commercial free speech rights. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 778 (1993).
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commercial speech that, albeit not directly harmful
to the listener, is inconsistent with the speaker's
membership in a learned profession and therefore
damaging to the profession and society at large. See
Zauderer, supra, 471 U.S. at 676-677 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part,
and dissenting in part); Shapero, supra, 486 U.S. at
488-491 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Peel, supra, 496
U.S. at 119 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In particular,
the States may prohibit certain "forms of
competition usual in the business world," Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)
(internal quotation marks omitted), on the grounds
that pure profit seeking degrades the public-spirited
culture of the profession and that a particular
profit-seeking practice is inadequately justified in
terms of consumer welfare or other social benefits.
Commercialization has an incremental, indirect, yet
profound effect on professional culture, as lawyers
know all too well.94
Despite Justice O'Conner's plea for professionalism, commercial
speech still trumps most advertising limitations imposed on members of
a learned profession. The question, then, is where the Court will draw
the line on permissible restrictions. Will it stop at the measurable-or-
verifiable commercial speech standard that seems to have guided its
decisions thus far, or will it open the door to any and all subjective,
unverifiable self-laudation, slogans, puffery, and hyperbole that are not
demonstrably false, fraudulent, or misleading? The Federal Trade
Commission, no advocate of ethical standards, even for a learned
profession, would much prefer the latter.
94. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 778 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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III. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S OFFICIOUS INTERMEDDLING
95
Before Central Hudson, the Court observed that "[t]he interest of
the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are
essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice,
and have historically been 'officers of the courts."', 96 When the Court
held that pharmacists could not be prohibited from advertising the prices
of prepackaged drugs, it noted that "the distinctions, historical and
functional, between [other] professions, may require consideration of
quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example ... render
professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the
consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they werer. . .. • ,,97
to undertake certain kinds of advertising. Chief Justice Burger agreed
that "quite different factors would govern were we faced with a law
regulating or even prohibiting advertising by the traditional learned
professions of medicine or law." 98 In those halcyon days the Court
recognized that in some instances the State may decide that "'forms of
competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the
ethical standards of a profession. 99 Even after Central Hudson, the
Court recognized that "'the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the
core of the State's power to protect the public." 00
In stark contrast to the Court's relatively restrained lawyer
advertising jurisprudence, even after Central Hudson, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has made itself a most effective advocate for any and
all lawyer advertising that is not demonstrably false and deceptive. It has
95. Blackstone defined maintenance, for example, as "an officious
intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either
party with money or otherwise." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES * 135.
96. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792. See also Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-24
(1961).
97. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 773 n.25 (1976).
98. Id. at 774 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
99. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792 (quoting United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y,
343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952)). See also Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294
U.S. 608, 611-13 (1935).
100. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569 n.18 (1984) (quoting Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977)).
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accomplished this, not without a touch of irony, through its use of
deliberately misleading and deceptively-worded letters to various state
supreme courts, state bar associations, and the American Bar Association
(ABA) that clearly imply-but never explicitly assert-authority that it
does not have.
10 1
A. The Parker Doctrine
It is true that modern jurisprudence has recognized some
Sherman Anti-Trust Act/FTC jurisdiction over regulated learned
professions in general and the legal profession in particular. Not to put
too fine a point on it, the Court held in Goldfarb that a local bar
association's minimum fee schedule, the deviation from which could
result in disciplinary action against the lawyer, constituted price fixing in
violation of the Sherman Act. 102 At the same time, Parker v. Brown,
0 3
makes it clear that state legislative acts, even if they have an anti-
competitive effect, are beyond the scope of the Sherman Act. The
threshold inquiry, then, in determining if an anti-competitive activity is
101. See, e.g., Letters from Fed. Trade Comm'n to the Florida, Louisiana, New
Jersey, New York and Texas State Bars, collected at American Bar Association,
Center for Professional Responsibility, FTC Letters Regarding Lawyer Advertising,
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalism/FTC-lawyerAd.html.
102. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791-92:
The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited
purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to
foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its
members. The State Bar, by providing that deviation from
County Bar minimum fees may lead to disciplinary action,
has voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private
anticompetitive activity, and in that posture cannot claim it is
beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.
(internal citation omitted). See also United States v. Or. State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507
(D. Or. 1974) (state bar association's fee schedule activities were not immune to
Sherman Act attack by either the "state action" doctrine or by the "learned
profession" exemption).
103. 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962). "We find nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to
restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature."
Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51.
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protected by the state action (or Parker) doctrine, is whether the activity
is required by the State acting as sovereign.'1°4 Thus the Parker doctrine,
when it applies, is an unassailable defense against FTC action under the
Sherman Act.
The lawyers in Bates first tried to raise a Sherman Act claim
against the rule prohibiting their advertisement.'0 5 The Court rejected the
Sherman Act claim because the Parker state action doctrine immunized
the advertising regulation from a Sherman Act claim. °6 A restraint on
lawyer conduct imposed by a rule promulgated by a state supreme court,
"the ultimate body wielding the State's power over the practice of law,"
is a restraint compelled by direction of the state acting as a sovereign,
and immune from a Sherman Act claim. 0 7 It follows that the FTC
likewise has no jurisdiction over such rules. 108
104. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52. See also Union Carbide, 370 U.S. at 707-08.
105. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359 (1977).
106. Id. at 359-60.
Applying the Parker doctrine in Bates.. . the Court held that
a state supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity,
occupies the same position as that of a state legislature.
Therefore, a decision of a state supreme court, acting
legislatively rather than judicially, is exempt from Sherman
Act liability as state action.
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984) (internal citation omitted).
107. Bates, at 359-60 (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791).
108. In Hoover, the Court held that a state supreme court, acting in a legislative
capacity by promulgating rules governing the examination and grading of applicants
for admission to the state bar, occupies the same position as that of a state
legislature. Thus the Parker doctrine precluded a bar admission candidate's claim
that a state supreme court's Committee on Examinations and Admissions had
conspired to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act by "'artificially
reducing the numbers of competing attorneys in the State.'" Hoover, 466 U.S. at
565. The Committee's actions (as adopted by the state supreme court) constituted
those of the State and ipsofacto were exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws
under the state action doctrine. Id. at 572-73 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 361).
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B. The FTC Generally Has No Jurisdiction to Interfere in Lawyer
Advertising Matters
Ignoring the Parker state action doctrine, the FTC does not
hesitate to comment on proposed state court rules that would restrict
lawyer advertising.0 9 Invariably its intervention includes this misleading
reference to its "statutory mandate:"
The FTC enforces laws prohibiting unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, which includes
primary responsibility for stopping deceptive
advertising practices.4 Pursuant to its statutory
mandate, the Commission encourages competition in
the licensed professions, including the legal
profession, to the maximum extent compatible with
other state and federal goals. In particular, the
Commission seeks to identify and prevent, where
possible, business practices and regulations that
impede competition without offering countervailing
109. The only exception that the author has found is in the Submission of the
Staff of the Federal Trade Commission to the American Bar Association
Commission on Advertising (June 24, 1994) (available online as an attachment to
Sept. 30, 2002 Letter to Alabama Supreme Court, infra note 110). There, the FTC
admits that it has brought no cases involving restraints on lawyer advertising because
such restraints "are typically formal rules issued by the courts, and thus, as state
action, are not subject to antitrust enforcement." Letter from Fed. Trade Comm'n
Staff to Robert G. Esdale, Clerk of the Ala. Supreme Court (Sept. 30, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v020023.pdf (quotation at page four of
attachment).
The FTC, along with the Justice Department, also opposes definitions of the
practice of law-again, a matter within the scope of the state action doctrine-that
prevent nonlawyers from providing services in competition with lawyers "in
situations where there is no clear demonstration that non-lawyer services would
actually harm consumers." Letter from R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att'y Gen., et al.,
to Denise Squillante & Lee J. Gertenbert, Co-Chairs, Task Force to Define the
Practice of Law in Mass. 1 (December 16, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/12/041216massuplltr.pdf See also Letter from R.
Hewitt Pate, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., to ABA Task Force on the Model
Definition of the Practice of Law (December 20, 2002), available at
http://ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.htm.
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benefits to consumers. 5 The Commission and its
staff have had a longstanding interest in the effects
on consumers and competition arising from the
regulation of lawyer advertising and solicitation.6
The FTC believes that while false and deceptive
advertising by lawyers should be prohibited,
imposing overly broad restrictions that prevent the
communication of truthful and non-misleading
information that some consumers value is likely to
inhibit competition and frustrate informed consumer
choice. This position is supported by research
indicating that overly broad restrictions on truthful
advertising may adversely affect prices paid and
services received by consumers."' 0
110. See, e.g., Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy
Planning, et al., to Richard Lemmler, Jr., Ethics Counsel, La. State Bar Ass'n 1-2
(March 14, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.govIbeVO7000.pdf. The internal
footnotes in the quoted paragraph are as follows:
4Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
5Specific statutory authority for the FTC's advocacy program
is found in Section 6 of the FTC Act, under which Congress
authorized the FTC "[t]o gather and compile information
concerning, and to investigate from time to time the
organization, business, conduct, practices, and management
of any person, partnership, or corporation engaged in or
whose business affects commerce," and "[t]o make public
from time to time such portions of the information obtained
by it hereunder as are in the public interest." Id. § 46(a), (f).
6See, e.g., Letter from FTC Staff to the Office of Court
Administration, Supreme Court of New York (Sept. 14,
2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/09/VO60020-
image.pdf; Letter from FTC Staff to the Professional Ethics
Committee for the State Bar of Texas (May 26, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/05N060017Comme
ntsonaRequestforAnEthicsOpinionlmage.pdf; Letter from
FTC Staff to Committee on Attorney Advertising, Supreme
Court of New Jersey (Mar. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/V060009.pdf; see also, e.g., Letter
from FTC Staff to Robert G. Esdale, Clerk of the Alabama
Supreme Court (Sept. 30, 2002), available at
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The ploy often works; lawyers and courts that should know
better bow to the FTC's pretended jurisdiction. For example, after the
New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Attorney Advertising
promulgated Proposed Attorney Advertising Guideline 4, which would
have permitted client endorsements or testimonials that were truthful,
that did not compare one lawyer to another, and that did not describe the
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v020023.pdf. In addition, the staff has
provided its comments on such proposals to, among other
entities, the Supreme Court of Mississippi (Jan. 14, 1994);
the State Bar of Arizona (Apr. 17, 1990); the Ohio State Bar
Association (Nov. 3, 1989); the Florida Bar Board of
Governors (July 17, 1989); and the State Bar of Georgia
(Mar. 31, 1987). See also Submission of the Staff of the
Federal Trade Commission to the American Bar Association
Commission on Advertising (June 24, 1994) (available
online as attachment to Sept. 30, 2002, Letter to Alabama
Supreme Court, supra).7See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, California Dental Association v.
Federal Trade Commission: The Revenge of Footnote 17, 8
Supreme Court Economic Review 265, 293-304 (2000)
(discussing the empirical literature on the effect of
advertising restrictions in the professions); In the Matter of
Polygram Holdings, Inc, et al, FTC Docket No. 9298 (F.T.C.
2003), at 38 n.52 (same); Frank H. Stephen and James H.
Love, Regulation of the Legal Professions, 5860
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 987, 997 (1999)
available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5860book.pdf
(Concluding [sic] that empirical studies demonstrate that
restrictions on attorney advertising likely have the effect of
raising fees); Submission of the Staff of the Federal Trade
Commission to the American Bar Association Commission
on Advertising, 5-6 (June 24, 1994) (available online as
attachment to Sept. 30, 2002, Letter to Alabama Supreme
Court, supra).
See also Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, et al.,
to S. Guy deLaup, President, La. State Bar Ass'n 1-2 (March 14, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/08/V0700131arules.pdf ("Empirical research has found
that restrictions on attorney advertising lead to higher prices for legal services and
there is little evidence that restricting attorney advertising is likely to raise the
quality of legal services.") (footnote 4 omitted).
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quality of the work the lawyer had performed,"' the FTC objected that
the proposed guideline "would prohibit truthful, non-misleading claims
about the nature of legal services, the quality of legal services, and
comparisons between providers of legal services, if such claims are made
through a client endorsement or testimonial.""1 2 This objection
challenged precisely the sort of sovereign state rulemaking that is
immune from FTC oversight. Nevertheless, the FTC went on to
complain that the proposed guideline would prohibit claims of
aggressiveness or comparisons of professionalism that have traditionally
been forbidden. 13 As of this writing, the FTC is winning; Attorney
Advertising Guideline 4 has not been approved by the New Jersey
Supreme Court nor formally adopted by the Committee on Attorney
Advertising.
The New Jersey Committee on Attorney Advertising also issued
Opinion 39, which concluded that advertisements publicizing certain
New Jersey lawyers as "Super Lawyers" or "Best Lawyers in America"
violated the prohibitions against advertisements that are comparative in
nature, and that are likely to create an unjustified expectation about
results.! 4 When "Super Lawyers" and the New Jersey State Bar
Association requested a stay, 1 5 the FTC filed an amicus curiae brief,
invoking its boilerplate assertion that it "encourages competition in the
licensed professions, including the legal profession, through enforcement
of the antitrust laws and competition advocacy," and compared "Super
Lawyer" and "Best Lawyer" designations to the National Board of Trial
111. N.J. Supreme Court Comm. on Attorney Advertising, Proposed Attorney
Advertising Guideline 4-Use of Endorsements or Testimonials from Clients (Dec.
30, 2005), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/reports/ProposedCA
AGuideline4.pdf.
112. Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, et al.,
to Comm. Sec'y, N.J. Supreme Court Comm. on Attorney Advertising, 2 (March 1,
2006), available at http://www.fic.gov/be/V060009.pdf.
113. Id. at 2 nn.8-9.
114. See N.J. Supreme Court Comm. on Attorney Advertising, Op. 39, 185
N.J.L.J. 360, 15 N.J. Law. 1549 (2006), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/
notices/ethics/CAAOpinion%2039.pdf and at http:/lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/ethics/ca
a/caa39_l .htmIl.
115. Henry Gottlieb, 'Super Lawyers' Edict Stayed by N.J. Supreme Court,
Law.com Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1156248910932
(last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
Advocacy certification in Peel that "are objectively verifiable statements
of fact."'"16 The New Jersey Supreme Court stayed Opinion 39,117 and
appointed a special master to develop a record that will form a basis for a
meaningful review by the court.' 18  The court adopted the special
master's conclusion that "state bans on truthful, fact-based claims in
lawful advertising could be ruled unconstitutional when the state fails to
establish that the regulated claims are actually or inherently misleading,"
vacated Opinion 39, and remanded the matter for revision in light of the
constitutional concerns and "the emerging trends in attorney
advertising."'"19
C. The FTC and the New York Rules Amendments
Two additional examples will serve to show how effective the
FTC can be, not only in persuading state bar rule makers not to act, but
in obtaining substantive changes in rule-making. In June, 2006, the New
York State Unified Court System proposed amendments to the New
York rules governing lawyer advertising, and invited comments. 120 The
FTC responded, objecting to a number of the proposed amendments.'12
116. Brief of the Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 14, 26, In re Opinion 39 of the Comm. on Attorney Advertising, 190
N.J. 250, 919 A.2d 845 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V070003opinion
39.pdf [hereafter Brief of the Federal Trade Commission].
117. Stay Order of Opinion 39, http://agencyblog.typepad.com/superlawyers/St
ay-Order.pdf. (last visited January 15, 2009).
118. ROBERT A. FALL, REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER IN INRE OPINION 39 OF THE
COMM. ON ATTORNEY ADVERTISING (2008), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.co
m/nj/SuperLawyers%20Master/20Report.pdf.
119. In re Opinion 39 of the Comm. on Attorney Advertising, 961 A.2d 722,
731 (N.J. 2008).
120. N. Y. State Unified Court System, Joint Appellate Rules Governing
Attorneys, Proposed Amendments to Rules Governing Lawyer Advertising (June
2006).
121. The FTC's response included objections to:
- Section 1200.6(a), which required the content of advertising and solicitation to
be "predominantly informational;"
- Section 1200.6(d)(3-6), which prohibited, inter alia, the voice or image of a
non-attorney spokesperson recognizable to the public, the portrayal of a judge,
the portrayal of a lawyer by a nonlawyer, the portrayal of the law firm as a
fictitious entity, the use of a fictitious name, the depiction of a courtroom or
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In its view, unfettered lawyer advertising is not only acceptable, but
preferable, because "[s]uch techniques may be useful to consumers in
identifying suitable providers of legal services" using "common methods
that advertising firms have used to make their messages memorable."' 22
The FTC was especially incensed about proposed changes to §
1200.8, which would deter lawyers from participating in client-matching
internet websites. Online matching programs invite attorneys to respond
to a consumer inquiry through the service, providing information such as
fees, experience and other qualifications. With this information, the
client decides whether and which attorneys to contact. Online matching
programs are desirable from the FTC's vantage point because they "have
the potential to reduce consumers' costs for finding legal representation,
which would likely increase competition among attorneys to provide
• ,,123
legal services. The FTC devoted nearly two pages of its comments to
its argument for online legal matching services. It brooked no concern
courthouse, the portrayal of a client by a nonclient, and reenactments that were
not actual or authentic;
- Section 1200.6(d)(7), which prohibited advertisement or solicitation made to
resemble legal documents;
- Section 1200.6(d)(8), which prohibited the use of a nickname, moniker, motto
or trade name that implies an ability to obtain results in a matter;
- Section 1200.6(e)(1), which prohibited statements that are reasonably likely to
create an expectation about results the lawyer can achieve;
- Section 1200.6(e)(2), which prohibited statements that compare the lawyer's
services with the services of other lawyers;
- Section 1200.6(l)(1), which prohibited pop-up advertisement in connection
with computer-accessed communications;
- Section 1200.6(k), which required all computer-accessed communications to
disclose all jurisdictions in which the law or members of the law firm are
licensed and all bona fide locations of the lawyer or law firm;
- Section 1200.6(o), which required the filing of a copy of the advertisement or
solicitation with the attorney disciplinary committee; and
* Section 1200.8, which regulated solicitation and recommendation of
professional employment.
Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, et al., Michael
Colodner, Counsel, New York Office of Court Administration (September 14, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/09/V
060020-text.pdf.
122. Id. at 3. The incidental use of actors in place of live lawyers, the FTC
says, could be clarified with disclosures.
123. Id. at 6.
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for professional ethics, decorum or dignity. To the contrary, it disdained
those qualities; increased competition and reduced consumer costs were
its only interest.1
24
While it is impossible to quantify the effect of the FTC's
. 125
objections, it is easy to determine which of the original proposals were
changed and which were not. The New York advertising rules as finally
adopted abandoned the requirement that the content of advertising and
solicitation be "predominantly informational." The adopted rules also
permitted reference to "bona fide professional ratings." They permitted
the use of non-attorney spokespersons and depictions of courtrooms or
courthouses, but they retained prohibitions against the portrayal of a
judge or a fictitious law firm, actors portraying the lawyer, members of
the law firm or clients, and the use of a nickname, moniker, motto or
trade name. At the same time, the rules permitted advertisements that
were reasonably likely to create an expectation about the results the law
can achieve, and statements that compare the lawyers services with the
services with other lawyers. Pop-up computer ads were limited to the
lawyer's or law firm's own website, and computer ads did not have to
disclose all office locations. The final version of the rules eliminated the
requirement that a copy of all advertisements be filed with the
Department of Disciplinary Committee, but it still required lawyers to
file a copy of all targeted solicitations. Finally, the amendments made no
change to the rules that the FTC argued could deter lawyers from
participating in client-matching websites."'
124. See id. at 6-7.
125. In addition to the FTC's comments, the presiding justices of the Appellate
Division's four departments in New York received more than 100 comments and
complaints from lawyers. John Caher, N.Y. Courts Adopt Moderated Version of
Lawyer Ad Rules, N.Y.L.J., (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/arti
cle.jsp?id=l 167991327244.
126. http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/j ointappellate/1200-6_fmaltext_101107.pdf
Sections 1200.6(c)(1) (endorsement of, or testimonial about, a lawyer or law firm
from a client with respect to a matter that is still pending), (3) (the portrayal of a
judge, the portrayal of a fictitious law finn, the use of a fictitious name to refer to
lawyers not associated together in a law firm, or otherwise imply that lawyers are
associated in a law firm if that is not the case), (5) (reliance on techniques to obtain
attention that demonstrate a clear and intentional lack of relevance to the selection of
counsel, including the portrayal of lawyers exhibiting characteristics clearly
unrelated to legal competence), (7) (utilization of a nickname, moniker, motto or
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The FTC won on about half of its complaints, but it lost on major
issues such as prohibitions against the portrayal of a judge or a fictitious
law firm, actors portraying the lawyer, members of the law firm or
clients, the use of a nickname, moniker, motto or trade name, and it lost
on the issue of allowing lawyers to participate in client-matching
websites. Characteristically, though, the FTC claimed that the revised
New York rules incorporated "nearly all of the FTC Staff s
, ,127
recommendations. Although the FTC lost on the issue of online legal
matching services in New York, it fared much better in Texas.
trade name that implies an ability to obtain results in a matter), and (g)(1) (utilization
of a pop-up or pop-under advertisement in connection with computer-accessed
communications, other than on the lawyer or law firm's own website or other
internet presence), have been enjoined from enforcement by order of the United
States District Court, Northern District New York, in the case of Alexander v. Cahill,
No. 5:07-CV- 117, 2007 WL 2120024 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007), appeal pending,
No. 07-3667-CV and 07-3900-CV (2nd Cir.), on First Amendment grounds. The
Alexander case will be discussed extensively in Part IV of this Article.
127. Brief of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 116, at 18. The FTC
is not always persuasive. The Standing Committee on Legal Ethics of the Indiana
State Bar Association, for example, rejected the FTC's opposition to
[O]verly broad restrictions that prevent the communication
of truthful and non-misleading information [that is] likely to
inhibit competition and to frustrate informed consumer
choice," noting that "claims of intentions to 'fight' to be
'tough' or to be 'aggressive' do little or nothing to actually
inform the public but may well create impressions or imply
comparisons which are false or misleading.
JEFFREY s. NICKLOY, ET AL., IND. STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON LAWYER ADVERTISING 7, 13 (2006), available at
http://www.inbar.org/content/pdf/
REPORT.pdf (citing the FTC's letter to the New Jersey Committee on Attorney
Advertising, supra note 112). In rejecting the FTC's objection, the Standing
Committee's proposed comment to Indiana's advertising rule included the
following:
Subjective advertising poses particular problems because it is
inherently not subject to verification or objective analysis.
For example, claims of intentions to "fight" to be "tough" or
to be "aggressive" do little or nothing to actually inform the
public but may well create impressions or imply comparisons
which are false or misleading. Furthermore, subjective
advertising which panders to a public impression of attorneys
as combative, devious or underhanded is inconsistent with
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D. The FTC and the Texas Ethics Committee
In August, 2005, the Professional Ethics Committee for the State
128Bar of Texas issued Ethics Opinion 561. The question before the
Committee was, "May a lawyer pay a fee to be listed on a privately
sponsored internet site which obtains information over the internet from
potential clients about their legal problems and forwards the information
to one or more lawyers who have paid to be listed on the internet site?""'
The Committee's answer, in a word, was "no." While the Texas
advertising rules permit a lawyer to pay reasonable fees for advertising
and public relations services, as well as the usual charges of a lawyer
referral service that meets the requirements of the state statute, only a
lawyer referral service operated by a governmental entity or a non-profit
entity was eligible for certification. 30 Inasmuch as the privately
sponsored internet site was a privately-owned, for-profit organization, it
did not meet the certification requirements under the statute. The
privately sponsored internet site did not provide allowable advertising or
the efficient, effective and equitable application of the law
and inherently deceptive. The use of subjective advertising
also imposes difficult enforcement problems upon the
Courts, requiring the use of valuable resources to determine
whether such advertising contravenes these Rules. For these
reasons, such advertising is to be discouraged, unless it is the
only means by which helpful information can be conveyed to
the public. Advertising containing objective information is
preferred, not only because it can presumably be
substantiated, but also because it allows prospective clients
to draw their own conclusions regarding the importance of
the information.
Id. at 13.
128. Tex. State Bar Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 561, 68 TEx. B.J. 1034, 1037
(2005), available at http://www.txethics.org/reference-opinions.asp?opinnionnum
=561. The Professional Ethics Committee is a committee of the State Bar of Texas,
whose members are appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas. TEx. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 81.091 (2008), available at http://www.texasbar.com/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfmn?ContentlD=3498. Committee opinions are not binding on the
Supreme Court. Id., § 81.092(c).
129. Texas Professional Ethics Opinion 561, supra note 128, at 1.
130. TEx. OCC. CODE ANN. § 952.102 (2004).
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public relations services, the Committee said, but instead existed to
solicit or refer prospective clients to subscribing lawyers who have paid a
fee, which violated the advertising rules.
13 1
An online legal matching service, LegalMatch, a California
company, asked the Committee to reconsider and clarify Opinion 561
with respect to whether LegalMatch's services violated TEX.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 7.03, which prohibited lawyers from
paying a nonlawyer to solicit or refer prospective clients. At that point
the FTC intervened, addressing a letter to the Chairman of the
Professional Ethics Committee for the State Bar of Texas, again falsely
asserting jurisdiction to enforce the federal antitrust laws over the legal
profession by "encourag[ing] competition in the licensed professions,
including the legal profession, both through enforcement of the antitrustS ,,132
laws and through competition advocacy. Although it cited no
empirical evidence, the FTC went on to speculate that online legal
matching services "are likely to reduce consumers' costs for finding legal
representation and have the potential to increase competition among
attorneys. 133 The coup de grace was the FTC's assertion that the state
bars of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Rhode Island had issued
ethics opinions explicitly allowing such services to operate, 34 and the
Utah State Bar had partnered with such a service to help clients find a
pre-screened Utah lawyer.' 35 Typically, though, the FTC failed to
131. Texas Professional Ethics Opinion 561, supra note 128.
132. Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, et al.,
to W. John Glancy, Chairman, Prof I Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex. (May
26, 2006), available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2006/O5/V060017CommentsonaRequ
estforAnEthicsOpinionlmage.pdf.
133. Id.
134. See N.C. State Bar Comm. on Ethics, Formal Ethics Op. 1 (2004),
available at http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?page= 12&from= 1/2004&to= 12
/2004; S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 01-03 (2001), available at
http://www.scbar.org/member-resources/ethics-advisory-opinions/&id=555; R.I.
Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2005-01 (2005), available at
http://www.courts.state.ri.us/supreme/ethics/pdfadvisoryopinions/2005-0 1 .pdf. See
also Nassau County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 01-4 (2001), available
at http://www.nassaubar.org/ethic-opinions-details.cfm?OpinionlD=7; Me. Bar Bd.
of Overseers Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 174 (2000), available at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/Ethics%200pinions/Opinion%20174.htm.
135. See Utah State Bar Referral Services, available at http://www.utahbar.org/
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mention that six other state bars, Nebraska, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Arizona, and South Dakota, had issued ethics opinions explicitly
prohibiting online legal matching services.
136
The Texas Ethics Committee caved. Although the Committee
commonly takes months, if not years, to issue an opinion, less than two
months after the FTC submitted its comments the Committee issued
Opinion 573, effectively overruling Opinion 561.37 Opinion 561 had
clearly held that under the Disciplinary Rules and the Texas Lawyer
Referral Act a lawyer may not pay a fee to be listed on a privately
sponsored internet site that obtains information over the internet from
potential clients about their legal problems and forwards the information
to one or more lawyers who have paid to be listed on the internet site.
38
Pretending that Opinion 561 somehow left the question open, Opinion
573 began with the presumption that lawyers could ethically participate
in online legal matching services, couching the question to be decided in
terms of "what requirements must be met in order for a Texas lawyer to
participate in a privately sponsored internet service that obtains
information over the internet from potential clients about their legal
public/lawyer referralservicemain.html. The Washington State Bar and the New
York Bar Association followed suit shortly after the FTC's letter to the Texas ethics
committee. See Wash. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Rules of Prof I Conduct, Informal
Op. 2106 (2006); N.Y.S.B.A. Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 799 (2006).
136. Pamela A. MacLean, FTC Weighs in on Internet Legal Referrals in Letter
to Bar, TEX. LAW., (June 26, 2006), available at http://www.legalmatch.com/popups
/TexasLawyer.html. See Neb. Supreme Court Lawyer Advertising Comm., Advisory
Op. 95-3 (1995), available at http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov/professional-ethics/la
wyers/ethics-pdfs/1990s/95-3.pdf; Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof I Ethics and
Conduct, Op. No. 97-23 (1998), available at http://www.iowabar.org/ethics.nsf/e61b
eed77a215f6686256497004ce492/b3180578cfd799708625660b0046d8c5!OpenDoc
ument; P.A. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Op.
96-112 (1996), available at http://www.legalethics.com/?p=328; Ohio Supreme
Court Bd. of Comm'r on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at
http://www.legalethics.com/?cat-ll&paged=2 (follow "Op. 2001-2" hyperlink);
Ariz. State Bar Comm. on the Rules of Prof I Conduct, Op. 99-06 (1999), available
at http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=500; and S.D. State Bar
Comm. on Ethics, Op. 98-10 (1999), available at http://www.sdbar.org/Ethics/Opini
ons/1 998/eo98- I 0.htm.
137. Tex. State Bar Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 573, 69 TEX. J. B. 888 (2006),
available at http://www.txethics.org/reference-opinions.asp?opinionnum=573.
138. Texas Professional Ethics Opinion 561, supra note 128.
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problems and forwards the information to lawyers who have paid to
participate in the internet service?" 139 The Committee then concluded
that an internet referral service was permissible, inter alia, if it operated
under a wholly automated process, based on the information provided by
potential clients and information provided by participating lawyers, and
it ensured that a potential client understood that lawyers who responded
had paid a fee to be included, and that the service made no assertions
about the quality of legal services. 1
40
The Federal Trade Commission, through deliberately misleading
claims of Sherman Act jurisdiction over the legal profession and
unrelenting opposition to restrictions on lawyer advertising, has been
fairly successful in promoting advertising rules that permit, if not
encourage, subjective and unverifiable quality-of-legal-services
advertising, self-laudation, slogans, puffery and hyperbole."' At the
same time, and without guidance from the Supreme Court, some state
bars have adopted rules to restrict such advertising. How those rules
have fared in the face of constitutional challenges is the subject of Part
IV.
IV. OPPOSING TRENDS IN THE LOWER COURTS
Not surprisingly, the inertia of professionalism in the Anglo-
American legal system has made it difficult for courts in the post-Bates
era, with only a few exceptions, to condone anything more than
objectively verifiable advertising. 142 Although advertising rules that
139. Texas Professional Ethics Opinion 573, supra note 137.
140. Id. In the Committee's revised opinion, an internet referral service
"would be an advertising or public relations service permissible for Texas lawyers
under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct rather than a prohibited
referral service" under Opinion 561.
141. Sloganeering is hardly limited to personal injury plaintiffs' lawyers. The
most respected white-collar law firms also have their slogans. See, e.g., "Industry
focused. Relationship driven.," Holland & Knight, http://www.hklaw.com/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2009); "We're Built for Change," Greenberg Traurig,
http://www.gtlaw.com/home.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2009); "Lifting
Expectations.," DLA Piper, http://www.dlapiper.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2009); or
"Intensity," Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP,
http://www.klgates.com/Home.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
142. The Bates Court observed that:
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permit subjective and unverifiable quality-of-legal-services advertising,
self-laudation, slogans, puffery and hyperbole may be the wave of the
future, the current majority view still seems inclined toward
professionalism. Some examples are mentioned in the margin.143
[i]t appears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of
etiquette and not as a rule of ethics. Early lawyers in Great
Britain viewed the law as a form of public service, rather
than as a means of earning a living, and they looked down on
"trade" as unseemly. Eventually, the attitude toward
advertising fostered by this view evolved into an aspect of
the ethics of the profession.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977) (citations omitted).
143. See, e.g.:
- Gould v. Fla. Bar, 259 F. App'x 208 (11 th Cir. 2007) (in accord with Gould v.
Harkness, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2006)).
- Fla. Bar v. Gold, 937 So. 2d 652, 656-57 (Fla. 2006) (republication or
circulation of news articles in direct mail solicitations referring to past successes
or results obtained).
. Gould v. Harkness, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
(advertisement of lawyer licensed in New York but not in Florida, who
maintained an office in Florida and advertised "New York Legal Matters
Only").
- Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Discipline Bd. v. Bjorklund, 725 N.W.2d 1, 8
(Iowa 2006) (statements about unmatched scholarly achievements, that the
lawyer was the foremost authority on drunk driving with vast knowledge,
experience and expertise that "has resulted in overwhelmingly favorable results
for clients").
. In re P.R.B., 868 A.2d 709, 709-10, 712 (Vt. 2005) (yellow page
advertisement that began "INJURY EXPERTS" followed by the names of the firm's
attorneys and a smaller caption that read "WE ARE THE EXPERTS IN" three
enumerated areas of the law).
- Hayes v. Zakia, 327 F. Supp. 2d 224, 230 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (statement that the
lawyer is certified as a specialist in a particular area of law without identifying
the certifying organization and prominently including a statement that the
certifying organization is not affiliated with any governmental authority, that
certification is not a requirement for the practice of law and does not necessarily
indicate greater competence than other attorneys experienced in that field of
law).
- In re Shapero, 780 N.Y.S.2d 680, 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (advertisement
in New York, depicting lawyer as an experienced, aggressive personal injury
lawyer who was prepared to take and had taken personal action on behalf of
clients, when lawyer who had continuously resided in Florida since 1991, had
not been actively engaged in practice of law in New York since 1995, who had
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never tried a case to conclusion, and whose role in firm was limited to acting as
spokesperson).
- In re Keller, 792 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (Ind. 2003) (in accord with Farrin v.
Thigpen, 173 F. Supp. 2d 427 (M.D.N.C. 2001)).
- In re Anonymous, 775 N.E.2d 1094, 1094 (Ind. 2002) (advertisement stating
"Bankruptcy, but keep house & car").
- Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 754 N.E.2d 219, 223, 229 (Ohio
2001) (letter soliciting representation of juvenile in high-profile school shooting
case, in which lawyer represented that his "entire specialty is representing
children and young adults in often major criminal matters," that he had a
national reputation, and that he was "the very best at what I do").
- Farrin v. Thigpen, 173 F. Supp. 2d 427, 447 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (lawyer's
television advertisement showing insurance adjustor recommending settlement
at the mere mention of the lawyer's name, followed by the actor Robert Vaughn
stating that insurance companies know the lawyer's name, and urging viewers
injured in an auto accident to tell them "you mean business" by calling the
lawyer).
- Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Mandello, 32 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Ky. 2000) (letter soliciting
medical malpractice case that stated that lawyer's background provided a
"strong basis" for representation, where the lawyer had been in practice only
two years and had never handled a medical malpractice case).
- Fla. Bar v. Elster, 770 So. 2d 1184, 1187-88 (Fla. 2000) (lawyer's business
card that read "Immigration Verification Associates," where lawyer has not and
never had any associate attorneys working for him).
- Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof I Ethics & Conduct v. Bjorklund, 617
N.W.2d 4, 9 (Iowa 2000) (advertisement distributed to movie theatre patrons
asking "Have You Been Caught Drinking and Driving" and answering "I Can
Help!").
- In re Wamsley, 725 N.E.2d 75, 77 (Ind. 2000) (advertisement on the back
cover of telephone directory proclaiming "Best Possible Settlement ... Least
Amount of Time").
- Fla. Bar v. Lange, 711 So. 2d 518, 521 (Fla. 1998) (yellow page advertisement
stating "All Federal & State Court in 50 States" and slogan "When the Best is
Simply Essential").
- Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shane, 692 N.E.2d 571, 573-74 (Ohio 1998)
(television advertisements that consisted of client endorsements, and
advertisements in the vein of "there's no charge unless we win your case,"
where the lawyer's standard contingent fee contract provided that clients were
liable for costs and expenses).
- In re Anonymous, 689 N.E.2d 442, 444 (Ind. 1997) (yellow page
advertisement describing the lawyer's firm as a "premier" personal injury law
firm with "the track record and resources you need to win a settlement").
- In re Anonymous, 689 N.E.2d 434, 434 (Ind. 1997) (lawyer advertising that he
specialized in personal injury cases when in fact he was not so certified).
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- Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof I Ethics & Conduct v. Kirlin, 570 N.W.2d
643, 644-45 (Iowa 1997) (advertising containing references to memberships in
professional organizations that did not include a "notice to the public" that such
memberships "do not mean that a lawyer is a specialist or expert in a field of
law, nor do they mean that such lawyer is necessarily any more expert or
competent than any other lawyer").
- Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof 1 Ethics & Conduct v. Wherry, 569 N.W.2d
822, 825 (Iowa 1997) (advertisement of practice in specific areas where lawyer
did not meet eligibility requirements).
- Medina County Bar Ass'n v. Grieselhuber, 678 N.E.2d 535, 536 (Ohio 1997)
(use of the words "We Do It Well" in advertisement).
. In re Robbins, 469 S.E.2d 191, 194 (Ga. 1996) (in accord with Trumbull
County Bar Ass'n v. Joseph, 569 N.E.2d 883 (Ohio 1991)).
- Miss. Bar v. Attorney R., 649 So. 2d 820, 824 (Miss. 1995) (lawyer's ad
listing various fields of practice without including required statement that state
did not certify expertise in the particular areas of the law).
- In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1271 (N.J. 1992) (a lawyer's solicitation of
victim's families the day after the remains of victims of the explosion of Pan
American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland were identified).
- Trumbull County Bar Ass'n v. Joseph, 569 N.E.2d 883, 884 (Ohio 1991) (use
of the term "specialize" where lawyer was not formally recognized).
- In re Zang, 741 P.2d 267 (Ariz. 1987) (lawyer advertising, particularly on the
electronic media, that were simply emotional, irrational sales pitches).
- In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 208 (N.J. 1986) (television
advertisement that utilizes drawings, animations, dramatizations, music, or
lyrics, that relies on techniques to obtain attention that depend upon absurdity
and that demonstrates a clear and intentional lack of relevance to the selection
of counsel, or that contains any extreme portrayal of counsel exhibiting
characteristics clearly unrelated to legal competence).
- Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Iowa
1985), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 475 U.S. 1114
(1986) (electronic lawyer advertising that contains background sound, visual
displays, more than a single, nondramatic voice, or self-laudatory statements).
- Leoni v. State Bar of Cal., 704 P.2d 183, 194 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (lawyers' letters sent to defendant debtors that were
"almost certain to cause panic and to mislead the recipients," which omitted the
amount of attorney fees the firm would charge, and which did not make it clear
to the lay recipients that the letters were advertisements).
- Spencer v. Supreme Court of Pa., 579 F. Supp. 880, 888 (E.D. Pa. 1984), affd
without op., 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. Pa. 1985) (the use of terms that subjectively
evaluate a lawyer's credentials or the quality of services).
- In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1982) (the use of
billboards, circulars, matchbooks, and inscribed pencils and pens).
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A. The ABA Model Restrictions on Lawyer Advertising
The American Bar Association first promulgated restrictions on
lawyer advertising in its 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics.'44 The
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility replaced the Canons in
1969. The Model Code was last amended in August, 1980. In the final
version, most (but not all) of the model advertising rules were contained
in "Selection of Lawyer: Lawyer Advertising," EC 2-9 through EC 2-15,
and DR 2-101 "Publicity in General,"' 145 which included prohibitions
against self-laudation146 and "representations concerning the quality of
service, which cannot be measured or verified."' 147 The Model Code was
superseded by the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.148
The Model Rules generally abandoned those useful prohibitions in favor
of a general rule providing that "[a] lawyer shall not make a false or
- In re Zimmerman, 438 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), appeal
dismissed, 440 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1981), appeal denied, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1029
(1981)) (lawyer who listed himself by his first name ("Aaron") so as to appear
first in each of 25 separate categories of practice in yellow page advertisements,
in several areas of which he admittedly had no experience).
- Eaton v. Ark. Comm. on Prof I Conduct, 607 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Ark. 1980)
(mail-out advertisement listing a $10 fee for an initial consultation with no time
or subject limitation, inclusion of the advertisement in a packet of discount
coupons from other local businesses).
- In re Oldtowne Legal Clinic, P.A., 400 A.2d 1111 (Md. 1979) (the use by
lawyers of trade names).
- In re Petition for Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d
638 (Tenn. 1978) (advertising in any area in which the lawyer is not currently
competent, the use of handbills, circulars, billboards, or by any other means,
except the established and regularly circulated, or broadcast, media, and
advertising that the lawyer is a specialist where there was no procedure for the
certification of specialists).
144. Advertising, addressed in Canon 27, was limited to "simple professional
cards" and "[p]ublication in reputable law lists." CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/CanonsEthics.pdf.
145. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.pdf.
146. Id. EC 2-8.
147. Id. EC 2-9.
148. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc-toc.htnl. The advertising regulations are
contained in the current Rules 7.1 through 7.6.
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misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A
communication is false or misleading if it contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading."
49
It should be noted that some of the early advertising cases were
decided under state equivalents of the Model Code. Since then, almost
all states have adopted some version of the Model Rules. That said, and
with some thirty years of post-Bates experience, two cases have come to
epitomize divergent views of Bates's progeny.
B. The Pit Bull Case
In the first case, Florida Bar v. Pape,150 the Florida Bar filed
complaints against two lawyers for their use of television advertising that
invoked the image of a pit bull dog wearing a spiked collar, utilized the
phrase "pit bull" in the firm's advertisement and logo, and prominently
displayed the firm's toll-free telephone number, 1-800-PIT-BULL. 15 1 The
advertising allegedly violated Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 4-
7.2(b)(3) and 4-7.2(b)(4), which stated:
(3) Descriptive Statements. A lawyer shall not make
statements describing or characterizing the quality of
the lawyer's services in advertisements and written
communications; provided that this provision shall
not apply to information furnished to a prospective
149. Id. R. 7.1. The State Bar of Nevada has officially sanctioned some of the
egregious forms of lawyer advertising. For example:
- You can now advertise testimonials, endorsements, and jury verdicts. The
main caveat is you must also include adequate disclaimers to overcome the
inherently misleading nature of such statements.
- You can now have accident scenes, be a cartoon, or otherwise have dramatic
and suspenseful depictions. RPC 7.2 (d), (e), and (f) have been revoked.
* If you are going to advertise a fee or range of fees, all the related conditional
terms (if any) must be included within reason.
State Bar of Nevada, TOP NINE THINGS YOU MIGHT NOT (BUT SHOULD) KNOW ABOUT
THE NEW LAWYER ADVERTISING RULES, available at
http://www.nvbar.org/scla/topten.htm.
150. 918 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2005).
151. Id. at 241-42.
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client at that person's request or to information
supplied to existing clients.
(4) Prohibited Visual and Verbal Portrayals. Visual
or verbal descriptions, depictions, or portrayals of
persons, things, or events must be objectively
relevant to the selection of an attorney and shall not
be deceptive, misleading, or manipulative.'
A referee found that the advertisement did not violate rule 4-
7.2(b)(3), drawing a distinction between an advertisement that describes
qualities of the attorneys and ads that describe the quality of legal
services. Similarly, the referee found that the ad did not violate rule 4-
7.2(b)(4) because pit bulls are perceived as "loyal, persistent, tenacious,
and aggressive," qualities that were objectively relevant to the selection
of an attorney because they were informational." 3 The Florida Supreme
Court disapproved the referee's findings and imposed discipline on the
two lawyers.
1. The Florida Supreme Court's Findings
Relying on comments to the rules, the court noted that the
advertising rules were designed to permit lawyer advertisements
providing "objective information about the cost of legal services, the
experience and qualifications of the lawyer and law firm, and the types
152. Id. at 242 (footnote omitted). See also FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4-7.2(c)(2), 4-7.2(c)(3) (2009), available at http://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtf
b.nsf/FV/805933D56732F188852573C6006D4167. The current version of Rules 4-
7.2(c)(2) and (c)(3) provide as follows:
(2) Descriptive Statements. A lawyer shall not make
statements describing or characterizing the quality of the
lawyer's services in advertisements and unsolicited written
communications.
(3) Prohibited Visual and Verbal Portrayals and
Illustrations. A lawyer shall not include in any advertisement
or unsolicited written communication any visual or verbal
descriptions, depictions, illustrations, or portrayals of
persons, things, or events that are deceptive, misleading,
manipulative, or likely to confuse the viewer.
153. Pape, 918 So. 2d at 242-43.
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of cases the lawyer handles."'5 4 "Advertisements using slogans... fail
to meet these standards and diminish public confidence in the legal
system." The combined effect of the "sensationalistic image" of a pit
bull and a slogan, the court continued, implied to consumers that the
attorneys [were] advertising themselves as providers of pit bull-style
representation in violation of the prohibition against advertising about
the quality of the lawyers' services. 55 The court found that the referee's
attempt to distinguish between the "quality of the lawyer's services" and
the qualities of the lawyer was an artificial one: "From the perspective of
a prospective client unfamiliar with the legal system and in need of
counsel, a lawyer's character and personality traits are indistinguishable
from the quality of the services that the lawyer provides."'
156
The court also found that the pit bull logo and telephone number
were manipulative and misleading, suggesting not only that the lawyers
could achieve results but that they also engaged in a combative style of
advocacy. "The suggestion is inherently deceptive because there is no
way to measure whether the attorneys in fact conduct themselves like pit
bulls so as to ascertain whether this logo and phone number convey
accurate information." 57 The court seemed almost obsessed with the
"darker side of the qualities often also associated with pit bulls:
malevolence, viciousness, and unpredictability," devoting two pages of
154. Id. at 243.
As a preliminary matter, the pit bull logo and 1-800 PIT-BULL
telephone number in the ad by the attorneys do not comport
with the general criteria for permissible advertisements set
forth in the comments to section 4-7 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. . . . The comment to Rule 4-7.1
provides that 'a lawyer's advertisement should provide only
useful, factual information presented in a nonsensational
manner.
Id.
Arguably there may be a due process problem in imposing discipline based on
unenforceable hortative comments, rather than on the disciplinary rules themselves.
But see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 655 (1985) (notice and opportunity to respond in a disciplinary
proceeding are sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process).
155. Pape, 918 So. 2d at 243-44.
156. Id. at 244.
157. Id.
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its opinion to studies and anecdotal examples. 15 It concluded that
permitting this type of advertisement would make a mockery of our
dedication to promoting public trust and confidence in our system of
justice. Prohibiting advertisements such as the one in this case is one
step we can take to maintain the dignity of lawyers, as well as the
integrity of, and public confidence in, the legal system.
159
2. Application of the First Amendment
The Pape court began its First Amendment analysis not with
Central Hudson, which is never mentioned in the opinion, but with the
proposition that "[1]awyer advertising enjoys First Amendment
protection only to the extent that it provides accurate factual information
that can be objectively verified."' 60 Working its way through the Bates
progeny, the court said that the Supreme Court in R.MJ. (the case in
which lawyers were limited to listing only prescribed areas of practice)
dealt with "restrictions on clearly factual and relevant information that
had not been found to be misleading or likely to deceive."' 61 With
respect to Zauderer the court noted that the Dalkon Shield advertisement
"did not promise results or suggest any special expertise but merely
conveyed that the lawyer was representing women in Dalkon Shield
litigation and was willing to represent other women with similar
claims.' 62 Finally, the court cited the opinion in the Peel case, where the
Supreme Court upheld the lawyer's right to list his certification by the
National Board of Trial Advocacy on his letterhead because "the facts as
to NBTA certification were 'true and verifiable."",1
63
Returning to the advertisement in Zauderer, the court observed
that while "[t]he Dalkon Shield illustration informed the public that the
lawyer represented clients in cases involving this device," the pit bull
158. Id. at 245-46.
159. Id. at 246-47 (footnote omitted). But see, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 368-72, 375-77 (1977)(potentially adverse effect of advertising on
professionalism and the quality of legal services was not sufficiently related to a
substantial state interest to justify so great an interference with speech).
160. Pape, 918 So. 2d at 247.
161. Id. at 248.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 249.
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image did not convey "objectively relevant information about the
attorneys' practice." 164 The court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court
requires a lawyer's advertisement to be objectively verifiable. Since the
image and the words "pit bull" were intended to convey an image about
the nature of the lawyers' litigation tactics, not objectively verifiable
information about the lawyers' practice, the "advertising device that
connotes combativeness and viciousness without providing accurate and
objectively verifiable factual information falls outside the protections of
the First Amendment."
165
C. The "Heavy Hitters" Case
The polar opposite of Pape is Alexander v. Cahill,'66 a New
York case that challenged three distinct categories of disciplinary rules-
restrictions on potentially misleading advertisements, restrictions that
imposed a thirty-day moratorium on certain communications following a
personal injury or wrongful death event, and the alleged application of
the rules to nonprofit legal organizations that did not charge clients.
61
This Article addresses only the first category, a challenge to five rules
amendments to prohibit potentially misleading lawyer advertising." 8
1. The Challenged Disciplinary Rules
The amendments prohibiting potentially misleading advertisements
included the following:
* an endorsement of, or testimonial about, a lawyer or law firm
from a client with respect to a matter that is still pending;
169
- the portrayal of a judge, the portrayal of a fictitious law firm,
the use of a fictitious name to refer to lawyers not associated
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. Id.
166. No. 5:07-CV-117, 2007 WL 2120024 (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 2007), appeal
pending, No. 07-3667-CV and 07-3900-CV (2nd Cir.).
167. Id. at*5-*11.
168. NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, AMENDMENTS To RULES
GOVERNING LAWYER ADVERTISING, available at http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/joint
appellate/1200-6_finaltext_1 01 107.pdf [hereinafter, New York Amended Rules].
169. Id. DR2-101(C)(1).
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together in a law firm, or otherwise imply that lawyers are
associated in a law firm if that is not the case;170
- rel[iance] on techniques to obtain attention that demonstrate a
clear and intentional lack of relevance to the selection of
counsel, including the portrayal of lawyers exhibiting
• • . 171
characteristics clearly unrelated to legal competence;
- utiliz[ing] a nickname, moniker, motto or trade name that
implies an ability to obtain results in a matter.
I7
The amended rules also provided that a lawyer or law firm shall not
utilize:
. a pop-up or pop-under advertisement in connection with
computer-accessed communications, other than on the lawyer or
law firm's own web site or other internet presence[.]173
After the amended rules were adopted, the law firm of Alexander
& Catalano, which had previously promoted itself as "the heavy hitters"
in broadcast media, print advertisements, and other forms of public
media, suspended certain of its advertisements and sought a declaratory
judgment and an injunction in federal district court prohibiting the
enforcement of these advertising restrictions on the grounds that they
violated its First Amendment rights.
7 1
170. Id. DR2-101(C)(3).
171. Id. DR2-101(C)(5).
172. Id. DR 2-101(C)(7).
173. Id. DR2-101(G)(1).
174. Alexander v. Cahill, No. 5:07-CV-117, 2007 WL 2120024, at *1-*2
(N.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 2007). The lawsuit, filed on February 1, 2007, was a calculated
challenge to the amended rules that became effective that same day. See New York
Amended Rules, supra note 168. "Prior to February 1, 2007, Alexander &
Catalano's commercials often contained jingles and special effects, including wisps
of smoke and blue electrical currents surrounding the firm's name. A number of the
firm's commercials also contained fictional or comical scenes." Cahill, 2007 WL
2120024, at * 1. The other plaintiff, Public Citizen, Inc. challenged different parts of
the amended rules that, while interesting, are not relevant to this discussion. Id. at
*2.
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2. The Court Ignored Objective Verification in its
Central Hudson Analysis
Ignoring the admonition in Bates, that quality-of-legal-services
claims may be so likely to be misleading as to permit restriction (which
Bates and its progeny have suggested is an objectively verifiable
standard), the district court purported to apply a Central Hudson analysis
to advertisements that were potentially misleading, concluding that
Alexander & Catalano could not be prohibited from employing such
hyperbole as depicting its lawyers towering over downtown buildings,
counseling space aliens about an insurance dispute, and running so fast to
reach a client in distress that they appeared as a blur.
75
The district court's initial inquiry'76 was whether New York had
a substantial interest in protecting consumers from misleading attorney
advertising. Of course it did.177 The parties stipulated that "[a]lthough a
very small minority of advertisements could be categorized as false or
deceptive on their face, about a third of them ...were found to be
deceptive.' 78 That satisfied the first prong of Central Hudson.79
175. Id. at *1-*2, *12-*13. A recent student note on Cahill argues that the
district court broke new ground by applying the Central Hudson test to advertising
that is only potentially misleading. Jay D. Kreismann & Menachem Lanner, Note,
The Cahill Decision: Evolution or Revolution? An Analysis of Alexander v. Cahill
and its Potential Effect on Attorney Advertising, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 841, 850
(2008). The Supreme Court has said, though, that "[s]tates may not completely ban
potentially misleading commercial speech if narrower limitations can ensure that the
information is presented in a nonmisleading manner." Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. &
Prof'1 Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 152 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
Query whether there is, or should be, a distinction between potentially
misleading speech, such as the use of the designation CFP (certified financial
planner) when the certification was made by a private organization and not the state,
and the hyperbole in Cahill that is plainly neither measurable nor verifiable.
176. Cahill, 2007 WL 2120024, at *5. The court made no mention of the
Central Hudson premise that the advertisement must concern a lawful activity and
must not be misleading. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
177. Cahill, 2007 WL 2120024, at *5-*6.
178. Id. at *6.
179. Id.
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The next inquiry was whether the amended rules materially
advanced the state's interest. At a minimum, as the Supreme Court
suggested in Went For It, the state must adduce anecdotal evidence, and
preferably extensive and detailed anecdotal and statistical studies, to
•• 180
support its position. The defendant Disciplinary Committees
submitted no statistical or anecdotal evidence, or studies from other
jurisdictions, of consumer problems with or complaints about misleading
attorney advertising. They did, however, submit a New York Bar
Association Task Force Report that reviewed the state of the law on
attorney advertising "in both its local and constitutional dimensions," as
well as summarizing empirical research on actual advertisements,
position papers, cases, and articles. The court found that the Report was
sufficient to support a finding that the state's interests were materially
advanced with respect to the amendments that prohibited the portrayal of
judges in attorney advertisements and that prohibited the use of trade
names that implied an ability to obtain results. 18
The court found, though, that the Disciplinary Committees had
failed to show how the remaining amendments to DR 2-101(C)
materially advanced the state's interest. Therefore, it enjoined (C)(1),
the prohibition against "an endorsement of, or testimonial about, a
lawyer or law firm from a client with respect to a matter still pending;"
(C)(3), the prohibition against "the portrayal of a fictitious law firm, the
use of a fictitious name to refer to lawyers not associated together in a
law firm, or otherwise imply[ing] that lawyers are associated in a law
firm if that is not the case;" (C)(5), the prohibition against the use of
techniques "that demonstrate a clear and intentional lack of relevance to
the selection of counsel, including the portrayal of lawyers exhibiting
characteristics clearly unrelated to legal competence;" and (C)(7), to the
180. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626 (1995).
The [Florida Bar] submitted a 106-page summary of its
2-year study of lawyer advertising and solicitation to the
District Court. That summary contains data-both statistical
and anecdotal-supporting the Bar's contentions that the
Florida public views direct-mail solicitations in the
immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on privacy that
reflects poorly upon the profession.
Id.
181. Cahill, 2007 WL 2120024, at *6.
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extent that it prohibited the use of a "nickname, moniker, motto or trade
name that implies an ability to obtain results ...,,82
The two amendments that survived the first two Central Hudson
prongs did not fare as well under the third test, i.e., whether they were
sufficiently narrowly tailored. The court found that the amended rules
prohibiting the portrayal of judges and prohibiting the use of trade names
that imply an ability to obtain results "are categorical bans."1 83 Since the
Disciplinary Committees failed to produce any evidence that measures
short of categorical bans, such as disclaimers or better enforcement of
existing rules on a case-by-case basis, would not accomplish the desired
result, these two amendments did not survive the last Central Hudson
test, and they too were enjoined.' 84
The court summarily disposed of the remaining amendments, the
prohibition of pop-up and pop-under advertisements on websites, by
noting that the Disciplinary Committees had adduced no evidence on the
substantial interest and state's interest prongs under Central Hudson, and
the state's argument on the last prong was "contrary to common sense"
because "there [was] no evidence that the regulation, observation, or
retention of pop-up and pop-under advertisements is any more difficult
than the regulation, observation, or retention of advertisements on
television, radio, or websites." Thus the court enjoined the enforcement
of these amendments as well, resulting in a clean sweep for the
advertising plaintiffs on all five challenged amendments. 85
182. Id. at *6-*7.
183. Id. at *8.
184. Id. at *8-*9.
185. Id. at *12-*13. The decision in Alexander v. Cahill is popular within the
blogosphere, see, e.g., Federal Court Decimates NY Lawyer Ad Rules,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2007/07/23/federal-court-decimates-ny-lawy
er-ad-rules/ (July 23, 2007, 16:31 EST) ("We interrupt our punditry hiatus
momentarily to report that Public Citizen has achieved a major victory against the
stupendously silly and over-reaching New York state lawyer advertising rules, which
went into effect on Feb. 1, 2007"); What is the State Bar Smoking?,
http://www.nyrealestatelawblog.com/professional-responsibility/index.html (July
25, 2007, 8:25 EST)
In my humble opinion, the federal court's decision should be
viewed as an embarrassment to all those who played a part in
the promulgation of those draconian restrictions. And, how is
it that 267 members of NYSBA's House of Delegates-
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V. RESTRICTING QUALITY-OF-LEGAL-SERVICES CLAIMS
Lawyer advertising that is more than "predominantly
informational," that includes self-laudation, slogans, puffery, hyperbole,
sensationalism or fictionalized dramatizations is, in the final analysis, a
quality-of-legal-services claim. Quality-of-legal-services claims, the
Bates Court noted, are not susceptible of measurement or verificationS• 186
and thus may be so misleading as to permit restriction. From the
oeuvre of the Court's professional advertising cases we can educe at least
three different restrictions on quality-of-legal-services claims that should
withstand commercial speech scrutiny.
many of whom are respected Bar leaders, seasoned trial
attorneys, and, practitioners with major white-shoe firms-
failed to recognize the fundamental constitutional infirmities
of the restrictions they were embracing?
Id.
Nevertheless, as noted herein, supra, note 143, the trend in the courts has been
to uphold restrictions on lawyer advertising. Only a few courts have held to the
contrary. See, e.g., Allen, Allen, Allen & Allen v. Williams, 254 F. Supp. 2d 614
(E.D. Va. 2003) (stating that state bar could be preliminarily enjoined from
disciplining lawyers who advertised that they were listed in The Best Lawyers in
America); Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (stating that although a
bar advertising rule prohibiting self-laudatory statements and statements describing
or characterizing the quality of the lawyer's services was not unconstitutional, the
bar could not prohibit a lawyer from including in his yellow page ad that he is "'AV'
Rated, the Highest Rating Martindale-Hubbell National Law Directory" because the
bar failed to satisfy the third prong of Central Hudson in that it failed to adduce any
evidence of identifiable harm); Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 470 A.2d 228, 233
(Conn. 1984) ("a blanket restriction on television advertising is not the sort of
narrow regulation that the Supreme Court countenanced in R.M.J. and Central
Hudson Gas."); Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (stating that
although a bar advertising rule prohibiting self-laudatory statements and statements
describing or characterizing the quality of the lawyer's services was not
unconstitutional, the bar could not prohibit a lawyer from including in his yellow
page ad that he is "'AV' Rated, the Highest Rating Martindale-Hubbell National
Law Directory" because the bar failed to satisfy the third prong of Central Hudson in
that it failed to adduce any evidence of identifiable harm).
186. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977).
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A. "The Special Problems of Advertising on the Electronic Broadcast
Media"
The Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions involving
professional advertising, starting with Bigelow v. Virginia and extending
through Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., have never condoned anything
beyond paper and print advertisements in newspapers or the yellow
pages, letterhead notations of specialization, and direct-mail,. • . 187
solicitations. The Court itself has recognized that "[o]ur lawyer
advertising cases have never distinguished among various modes of
written advertising to the general public."' 8 8 The Court has never
forsworn its observation in Bates that "[a]s with other varieties of speech,
187. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 618 (1995) (prohibition
against sending targeted, direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for
thirty days following an accident or disaster, or accepting referrals obtained in
violation of that prohibition, could be enforced); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. &
Prof 1 Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (advertisements using the designations
"CPA" and "CFP" in relation to law practice could not be prohibited); Peel v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 107 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (stating that letterhead stating that lawyer was certified as a
specialist by a national certification authority could not be prohibited); Shapero v.
Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (stating that truthful, nondeceptive letters
to potential clients known to face particular legal problems cannot be prohibited);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 626-27 (1985) (stating that newspaper advertisement containing accurate
illustration of Dalkon Shield and offer of legal advice in Dalkon Shield cases cannot
be prohibited); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (stating that newspaper and yellow
page advertisements containing truthful, non-misleading listing of practice areas
cannot be prohibited); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (stating that letter
soliciting litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and association, as
well as a means of communicating useful information to the public, and not for
pecuniary gain, cannot be prohibited); Bates, 433 U.S. at 350 (1977) (stating that
truthful newspaper advertisement that listed certain legal services and the fees for
those services could not be prohibited); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (stating that advertising prescription
drug prices cannot be prohibited); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (stating
that newspaper advertisement announcing the availability of legal abortions and
providing contact information could not be prohibited). The Court did uphold a ban
on in-person solicitation by lawyers in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978).
188. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473 (emphasis added).
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it follows as well that there may be reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of advertising . . . . And the special problems of
advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special
consideration."1
89
The Court reaffirmed that proposition in R.MJ.'9° and
Zauderer.191 The lower courts have concurred. 92 The eight hundred
pound gorilla in the room has been the general failure of the courts, with
the notable exception of the Iowa Supreme Court in Humphrey I, to
address the "special problems" of electronic advertising in general andS • 193
television advertising in particular. A television ad was at issue in
Pape, but neither the Supreme Court of Florida nor the United States
Supreme Court addressed it in the context of "the special problems of
advertising on the electronic broadcast media."'
94
It is true, as the Court observed in Shapero, that "[i]n assessing
the potential for overreaching and undue influence, the mode of
communication makes all the difference."' 95 The first presidential debate
between Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy on September 26, 1960,
is the classic example. Radio listeners generally thought Nixon won, but
those who watched the televised version saw an obviously uncomfortable
Nixon, refusing makeup to hide his five-o'clock shadow, underweight,
pallid and dressed in an ill-fitting shirt following a two-week hospital
stay, vying against a tan, confident and well-rested Kennedy. "Those
189. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (citations omitted).
190. R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 201 n.13.
191. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 673 n.1 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
192. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey (Humphrey I1),
377 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal
question, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986); In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 195 (N.J.
1986); and In re Zang, 741 P.2d 267, 279 (Ariz. 1987). But see Petition for Rule
Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Tenn. 1978) ("We are not
unmindful of the Bates phraseology that 'the special problems of advertising on the
electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration.' We are not in
agreement. . . . Advertising is advertising irrespective of the device or
instrumentality employed.").
193. See Comm. on Prof I Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey (Humphrey 1), 355
N.W.2d 565, 568 (Iowa 1984), vacated and remanded, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985).
194. Fla. Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240.
195. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475 (1988).
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television viewers focused on what they saw, not what they heard.
Studies of the audience indicated that, among television viewers,
Kennedy was perceived the winner of the first debate by a very large
• ,,196
margin.
The phenomenon is similar in the context of lawyer advertising,
as the Iowa Supreme Court succinctly explained in Humphrey II:
Electronic media advertising, when contrasted with
printed advertising, tolerates much less deliberation
by those at whom it is aimed. Both sight and sound
are immediate and can be elusive because, for the
listener or viewer at least, in a flash they are gone
without a trace. Lost is the opportunity accorded to
the reader of printed advertisements to pause, to
restudy, and to thoughtfully consider. 97
Thus "electronic advertising presents a very strong potential for
abuse, justifying its regulation., 198 Regulation was further justified, the
court said in Humphrey II, when the advertising shifted from providing
information about the availability and cost of legal services to
"[e]lectronically conveyed image-building .... The special potential for
abuse presented by electronic lawyer advertising is especially apparent at
the important line we have tried our best to draw between the
dissemination of protected information and crass personal promotion." 99
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, weighing similar concerns in
In re Felmeister & Isaacs,200 started with the premise that the "twin
196. Erika Turner Allen, Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debates, 1960,
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/KlhtmlK/kennedy-nixon/kennedy-nixon.htm
(though perhaps not technically an advertisement, the debate served the purpose of
allowing the candidates to try to "sell" themselves to voters) (last visited April 7,
2009).
197. 377 N.W.2d at 646 (footnote omitted). Cf FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans"); Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1972) ("viewers [of broadcast media] constitute a
'captive audience').
198. Humphrey II, 377 N.W.2d at 647.
199. Id. Although television advertisements were at issue in Pape and Cahill,
neither court discussed "the special problems of advertising on the electronic
media."
200. 518 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1986).
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goals" of lawyer advertising are informing the public and making legal
services affordable. 20 Noting that to be effective, advertising must
attract and hold the consumer's attention, the court:
opted for a regulation that allows a minimum
amount of non-rational content, enough to attract
attention and create interest. Our regulation would
require that the advertisement be 'predominantly
informational,' i.e., that in both quantity and quality,
the communication of factual information rationally
related to the need for and selection of an attorney
202predominates.
Significantly, the court "decided to continue more substantial
restrictions on television advertising. There is no doubt that the potential
impact of irrational factors is greatest in that medium., 20 3 The more
substantial restrictions applicable to television advertising included the
prohibition of drawings, animations, dramatizations, music, or lyrics.
The rule also prohibited all advertisements "that contain any extreme
portrayal of counsel exhibiting characteristics clearly unrelated to legal
competence.
' '
"
4
The court then subjected the predominantly informational
requirement, the special television restrictions, and the extreme portrayal
prohibition to a Central Hudson analysis. The state's interest in the first
two categories was in assuring that a client's choice of counsel was based
on rational, not emotional or irrational, factors. 205 The state's interest in
the restriction on extreme portrayals was the preservation of public
206confidence in the bench and the bar. The direct relationship between
all three rules and the state's interest was apparent, the court said, and
207they were likewise the least restrictive alternative.
201. Id. at 192.
202. Id. at 193, 194.
203. Id. at 195.
204. Id. at 208 (Appendix).
205. Id. at 198.
206. Id. at 202.
207. Id. at 200, 202, 203.
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The court in In re Zang followed Humphrey H and Felmeister
& Isaacs with dicta warning that "dramatic, nonfactual advertisements
are more likely to misrepresent or omit material facts, or to create
unjustified expectations about the results a lawyer can achieve than are
advertisements that primarily convey factual information that will help
consumers make rational decisions about whether to seek legal
,,209
services. Since consumers have more experience with consumer
products than with legal services, "the Rules of Professional Conduct do
not tolerate the same sort of sales pitch for legal services that the Federal
Trade Commission tolerates for most consumer products. 210
While the Zang court was not willing to place special restrictions
on electronic advertising, it did adopt New Jersey's "predominately
informational" standard as an aspirational goal that was "consistent with
the rationale for extending first amendment protection to lawyer
advertising and with the public's interest in access to and knowledge
about ... legal services." 21' The court concluded that "the bar should
examine lawyers' advertisements to determine whether, taken as a
whole, they are predominately informational or are simply emotional,
irrational sales pitches. While the latter may not be prohibited [by the
advertising rule], they should be examined carefully to assure that they
are neither false nor misleading. 212
In sum, the courts that have addressed the special problems of
electronic advertising have recognized that it can be significantly more
likely than print advertising to lend itself to emotional and irrational
appeals that require special treatment. Such ads are also more likely to
be false or misleading because they may misrepresent or omit material
facts or create unjustified expectations about the results a lawyer may
achieve, which would take the advertisement entirely out of the First
Amendment protection provided by Central Hudson.
208. 741 P.2d 267 (Ariz. 1987).
209. Id. at 278-79.
210. Id. at 279.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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B. Quality-of-legal-services Claims May Be Misleading
Because They Are Not Measurably and Objectively Verifiable
Another question reserved in Bates and still unaddressed by the
Supreme Court is whether claims concerning the quality of legal services
are "so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction."2 13 In Peel, the
Court recognized a "distinction between statements of opinion or quality
and statements of objective facts that may support an inference of
quality. 21 4 In that same context, the Court has continued to observe that
unverifiable claims concerning the "'quality of legal services ... may be
so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction., 2 15  Indeed, in
216California Dental Ass 'n v. FTC, a Sherman Act case, the Court, citing
Bates, declared that "[i]t is, indeed, entirely possible to understand the
[Dental Association's] restrictions on unverifiable quality and comfort
advertising as nothing more than a procompetitive ban on puffery.
'217
The Court continued, "[t]he question here, of course, is not whether
213. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) ("advertising
claims as to the quality of services-a matter we do not address today-are not
susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so
likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction.") Also see Zauderer, where the
Court noted that:
[a]lthough our decisions have left open the possibility that
States may prevent attorneys from making nonverifiable
claims regarding the quality of their services, they do not
permit a State to prevent an attorney from making accurate
statements of fact regarding the nature of his practice merely
because it is possible that some readers will infer that he has
some expertise in those areas.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 640 n.9 (1985) (internal citation omitted).
214. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S.
91, 101 (1990) (plurality opinion).
215. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988) (quoting Bates, 433
U.S. at 383-84).
216. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
217. Id. at 778. In a Sherman Act case, the Court applies a rule of reason test
that "demands a more thorough enquiry into the consequences of those restraints,"
id. at 759, as opposed to the First Amendment intermediate scrutiny review it applies
to state bar disciplinary rules under the intermediate scrutiny standard of review.
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puffery may be subject to governmental regulation, but whether a [non-
official] professional organization may ban it.
' 218
Unlike the question in California Dental Ass 'n, which involved
regulations imposed by an unofficial professional association, the
question for lawyers is whether, under the Parker doctrine, a state
supreme court, through its disciplinary rules, can ban quality-of-legal-
services claims without running afoul of commercial free speech
interests. The Model Code's prohibition of quality-of-legal-service
claims, adopted in many jurisdictions, has never been stricken as
unconstitutional.2 '9 The answer, then, to the question whether quality-of-
legal-services claims may be subject to governmental regulation seems to
be "yes," simply because such claims are not measurably and objectively
verifiable .22
218. Id. at 778 n.14. The California Dental Association (CDA) was a non-
profit professional association of dentists, but it was not a state agency. Thus the
FTC's jurisdiction extends to the CDA, which "provides substantial economic
benefit to its for-profit members, but that where, as here, any anticompetitive effects
of given restraints are far from intuitively obvious, the rule of reason demands a
more thorough enquiry into the consequences of those restraints than the Court of
Appeals performed." Id. at 759.
219. A distinction should be made between subjective quality-of-legal-services
claims and statements of verifiable recognition. See, e.g., Peel, 496 U.S. at 111
(holding that a statement of certification by National Board of Trial Advocacy could
not be prohibited). The distinction was made more difficult to discern when the self-
laudatory prohibition of MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)
(1980) was replaced by MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2007), which
simply provides that "[a] lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication
about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if
it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading."
220. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 249 (Fla. 2005) ("We conclude
that an advertising device that connotes combativeness and viciousness without
providing accurate and objectively verifiable factual information falls outside the
protections of the First Amendment.").
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C. Empirical Evidence Can Support the Asserted Governmental Interest
in Protecting the Profession from Advertising that Reflects Poorly on
the Profession
The second prong of the Central Hudson test asks whether the
221regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted.
Although the Court has said that Central Hudson does not require that
"'empirical data come .. . accompanied by a surfeit of background
information, ' ' 222 neither is the state's burden satisfied by mere speculation
or conjecture. It must adduce some evidence that the regulation in
question advances its asserted interests in a direct and material way.223
Thus, in Zauderer, the bar's failure to cite any evidence or authority that
the use of illustrations in lawyer advertising would be misleading,
manipulative, or confusing to the public was fatal,224 as was the lack of
empirical evidence in Peel that the letterhead listing of the lawyer's
- . 225
certification as a specialist was deceptive.
In Went For It, on the other hand, the Florida bar adduced
empirical evidence to support its assertion that its interest in protecting
privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones
221. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980). Prior to Central Hudson, a lawyer's advertising for "remunerative
employment [was] a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment
concerns .... While entitled to some constitutional protection, [such lawyer's]
conduct [was] subject to regulation in furtherance of important state interests."
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978).
222. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Fla.
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)).
223. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) ("It presents no studies
that suggest personal solicitation of prospective business clients by CPA's creates
the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence that the Board
claims to fear. The record does not disclose any anecdotal evidence, either from
Florida or another State, that validates the Board's suppositions.").
224. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985).
225. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S.
91, 108 (1990) (plurality opinion); accord Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 957-58
(lth Cir. 2000) (holding that without empirical evidence that advertisement
asserting that lawyer's Martindale-Hubbell "AV" rating was "the Highest Rating"
would mislead the unsophisticated public, advertisement did not violate prohibition
against self-laudatory advertising).
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against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers was substantial, as well as
its interest "in preventing the erosion of confidence in the profession that
such repeated invasions have engendered. ''226  The Bar offered a one
hundred and six page summary of a two-year study of lawyer advertising
and solicitation, based on survey data and anecdotal evidence, that found
that "the Florida public views direct-mail solicitations in the immediate
wake of accidents as an intrusion on privacy that reflects poorly on the
profession.''227 The Court said that the Bar's evidence satisfied the second
prong of the Central Hudson test.
228
Given the Florida Bar's evidentiary success in Went For It, it is
interesting that the Bar adduced no evidence to support its position in
Pape, that the lawyers' pit bull advertising campaign would "lead a
reasonable consumer to conclude that the attorneys are advertising
themselves as providers of 'pit bull'-style representation. ''229 The Bar
prevailed nevertheless when the court concluded for other reasons that the
230pit bull ads were not constitutionally protected.
The New York Disciplinary Committees did not fare as well in
Alexander v. Cahill, where the trial court applied the Central Hudson
test.231 The state's burden on the second prong of the Central Hudson test
was the same in Cahill as it was in Went For It, and the court recognized
that the empirical and anecdotal evidence adduced in Went For It was
226. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995).
227. Id. at 626.
228. Id. at 628. The Court went on to approve the Bar's regulation. "The Bar's
proffered study... provides evidence indicating that the harms it targets are far from
illusory. The palliative devised by the Bar to address these harms is narrow both in
scope and in duration. The Constitution, in our view, requires nothing more." Id. at
635.
229. Fla. Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 244 (Fla. 2005).
230. Perhaps the Bar needed no such evidence, inasmuch as the Florida
Supreme Court did not employ a Central Hudson analysis before concluding that the
advertisements were not constitutionally protected. The only evidence the court cited
was a veterinary association study and several court decisions recognizing "the
dangerousness of pit bulls." Id. at 245.
231. Alexander v. Cahill, No. 5:07-CV- 117, 2007 WL 2120024 (N.D.N.Y. Jul.
23, 2007), appeal pending, No. 07-3667-CV and 07-3900-CV (2nd Cir.). As noted
earlier, this discussion is limited to the New York rules restricting potentially
misleading advertisements. See supra, Part IV.
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sufficient to carry the state's burden on the second prong. Nevertheless,
the court categorically rejected the Disciplinary Committees' assertion that
"they are entitled to rely on common sense, history, and consensus alone to
support the State's restrictions in the absence of other evidence, apparently
because the Disciplinary Committees neither duplicated the Florida Bar's
study in Went For It nor asked the court to take judicial notice of it.233 The
lesson learned is that if it is properly supported with evidence, states can
assert a governmental interest in restricting advertising that reflects poorly
on the profession, but courts are not willing to accept mere conventional
wisdom in lieu of such evidence.
CONCLUSION
Many state rule-making authorities, often bowing to illegitimate
pressure from the Federal Trade Commission, now permit or at least
acquiesce in quality-of-legal-services claims in the electronic media,
especially television, including self-laudation, slogans, puffery, hyperbole,
sensationalism, and fictionalized dramatizations, none of which are
susceptible of verification and measurement, and most of which reflect
poorly on the profession. At the same time, rules adopted by the Florida
Supreme Court to restrict such advertising have withstood constitutional
scrutiny. On the other hand, enforcement of similar rules adopted by the
New York Disciplinary Committees has been enjoined on constitutional
grounds. The conflicting constitutional analyses are ripe for resolution; the
Supreme Court has not written on lawyer advertising in more than twenty
years, and it has never written on "the special problems of advertising on
the electronic broadcast media [that] will warrant special consideration"
that it reserved in Bates.3
232. Id. at *5 n.5. The court went on to note that Kentucky authorities have
successfully relied in part on the Florida Bar's study in support of a statute that
prohibited and criminalized the solicitation of accident victims by attorneys within
thirty days of an accident. Id. at *4 (citing Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397, 403-
04 (6th Cir. 2001)). The Cahill court also cited Capobianco v. Summers, 377 F.3d
559, 562 (6th Cir. 2004), which found that "newspaper articles documenting
solicitation problems related to chiropractors, declarations of solicited individuals,
and articles from scientific and business publications" were adequate. Id. at *5.
233. Id. at *5 n.5.
234. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
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As this is written, Cahill is the only lawyer advertising case in the
appellate pipeline that has certiorari potential. Cahill presents a head-on
collision between the Central Hudson premise that commercial speech
enjoys some First Amendment protection and the still-unanswered
question in Bates-whether lawyers' quality-of-legal-services claims may
be so likely to be misleading as to permit restriction.235 If so, what special
considerations are warranted because of the "special problems of
advertising on the electronic broadcast media?
236
The Court did not take a wrong turn with Bates; lawyer
advertising that is susceptible of measurement or verification is at once
useful to the consuming public and consistent with true professionalism.
The Court's tacit assent to the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in
Humphrey II is some precedent for acknowledging the distinction between
objective and verifiable written advertising and self-laudatory advertising
on television.23' But the Court is in grave danger of taking a wrong turn if
it does not allow States to limit lawyer advertising to claims that are
susceptible of measurement or verification with special considerations for
electronic advertising.
Relying on its existing jurisprudence, the Court should draw the
line of permissible lawyer advertising for states that desire to maintain
professionalism and dignity in our learned profession, at measurable and
objectively verifiable claims in the media. Above all, the Court should not
forget that "when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is
subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions."23s Thirty-
five years of experience of self-laudation, slogans, puffery, hyperbole,
sensationalism, and fictionalized dramatizations have proven that such
advertising is, indeed, subject to abuse. For a learned profession in which
membership "is a privilege burdened with conditions, '239 including
universally accepted conditions that already limit members' First
Amendment rights, restricting lawyer advertising to claims that are
measurable and objectively verifiable does not seem at all unreasonable.
235. Id. at 383-84.
236. Id. at 384.
237. See supra, text accompanying notes 88-90.
238. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
239. In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917).
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